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ABSTRACT 
Planning, executing, and monitoring Command and Control (C2) is difficult to 
accomplish on many levels, yet much has been learned in terms of applying improved 
technology to achieve it. This knowledge seems directly transferable from the battlefield 
to any environment requiring improved C2. This thesis demonstrates how DoD 
Information Technology architecture can be used to enhance C2 of a medium sized urban 
police department (PD) struggling to reduce gang violence in the face of significant 
resource reductions. Using a field demonstration, researchers demonstrate how a 
Common Tactical Picture (CTP) can improve officer effectiveness at the Salinas Police 
Department (SPD) in Salinas, California. Upon completion of the field demonstration, 
comparisons are made between the existing information and communications architecture 
of SPD and a baseline Joint Battlespace Awareness ISR Integration Capability (JBAIIC) 
testbed architecture to identify capability gaps that limit SPD’s ability to more effectively 
combat violent crime. Based on this analysis, a Technology Implementation Plan (TIP) is 
created, identifying courses of action available to SPD so that current and upcoming 
technological initiatives can be properly implemented—and potentially transferred to 
other municipal Law Enforcement agencies needing to extend their own their limited 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
1. Salinas California and Gang Violence 
In 2009, the homicide per capita rate ranked the city of Salinas fourth in the State 
of California (Fetherolf, 2010). Despite a nationwide decrease in homicides from 2006 to 
2009, the homicide rate in Salinas increased during this same period and, by 2009, was 
four times the national average (Dept of Justice, 2009). Additionally, of the 29 homicides 
in 2009, all were gang related (Lorentz, 2010). 
To address this problem, the Salinas Police Department (SPD) needs modern 
technology supported by an information and communications architecture (herein 
referred to as ‘architecture’) capable of providing police a secure means to access and 
distribute information. Specifically, this architecture must be capable of combating 
Salinas’ most significant threat: gang violence. This architecture cannot focus solely on 
the adoption of new technology but must also address how the entire spectrum of SPD’s 
Information Technology (IT) relates to both its Enterprise Architecture (EA) and current 
business processes. Unfortunately, SPD is not supported at present by such an 
architecture.  
The Information and Communications architecture of SPD is old and antiquated 
and consists of many stand-alone information silos that do not communicate with other 
essential systems (Officer #1, personal communication, February 10, 2011). For example, 
the fingerprint, mug shot, and Records Management System (RMS) databases are not 
linked to each other, requiring a significant time commitment from officers accessing 
these systems. In its present state, the technology employed by SPD is not capable of 
meeting the needs of those tasked with reducing crime (Officer #1, 2011). 
Further complicating matters is the reality that increasing the capabilities of any 
police force is very expensive. Funding for SPD for these expenses is received from the 
city of Salinas, which is in turn impacted by the weakness of the economy. With police  
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resources tied to both annual funding cycles and the economy, a recession provides gangs 
with increased opportunities to commit crime under the surveillance of a technologically 
challenged police force.  
In 2010, the budget crisis in Salinas required the Chief of Police to reduce SPD by 
19 sworn officers and 7 staff members to help balance the 2010/2011 budget (Fetherolf, 
2010). In 2011, despite a 20% reduction in the city’s workforce, a $7 million deficit 
remained resulting in the Mayor’s announcement that additional vital services would be 
cut (Solana, 2011). According to Salinas Mayor Dennis J. Donohue, this deficit “will 
require some sacrifice by all city employees” (Solana, 2011). If citywide pay concessions 
are unable to close this gap, then SPD could face a 10% reduction in current funding. 
This would mean the additional loss of as many as twenty sworn and seven community 
service officers (Officer #3, personal communication, February 10, 2011). The above 
scenario paints a dire picture of SPD’s ability to hold back the rising tide of crime and 
salvaging a sense of community from those who are attempting to tear it apart.  
2. Capabilities 
SPD also receives funding for resources through alternate sources such as state 
and federal grants. SPD has received the following capabilities via grant funding (T. 
Molfino, Personal Communications, January 26, 2011): 
• Internet accessible digital voice recorders for use with field report writing 
(Funding source: Community Oriented Policing Service (COPS) Grant) 
• 3G wireless Internet connectivity for all patrol vehicles mobile data 
terminals (MDT) including data plans for 18 months (Funding Source: 
Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance grant program) 
• 200 portable and 70 handheld vehicle mounted broadband radios as part of 
the NGEN Unity radio project (Funding source: COPS Grant) 
While the above technologies will significantly improve SPD’s immediate 
capabilities, they will also introduce significant challenges that, if not properly addressed, 




• Integrating new technology into current business practices 
• Adapting the culture of SPD to the new technologies being introduced  
• Preventing unauthorized access and loss of sensitive information through 
the voice recorders and/or MDT 
• Configuration challenges associated with integrating new technology into 
the existing information and communications architecture 
• Compliance with local, state, and national data and information sharing 
standards  
Responding to the above challenges creates a daunting task for any agency with a 
full time support staff and even more so for an agency that already had its manpower 
reduced and is looking at further reductions. Either way, these challenges must be 
addressed or SPD risks significant reductions in officer effectiveness.  
Finally, gangs exhibit many similarities in “structure and tactics” to insurgent 
groups and exist “because of an information advantage bestowed upon them by the 
population” (Arnold, O’Gwin, & Vickers, 2010). This information advantage, when 
augmented with modern communications technology, such as smart phones, allows gangs 
to effectively coordinate and carry out acts of violence as demonstrated by the 2009 
Salinas murder rate. Therefore, to combat gangs, the police need an information and 
communications architecture that goes beyond being able to respond to and apprehend 
the typically self-motivated but unorganized criminal such as a bank robber. The 
nightstick, flashlight, and side arm will not suffice to prevent or to reduce such crime. As 
long as the balance of information remains in favor of the gangs, the efforts of SPD will 
remain reactionary, as they will have no way to effectively respond to the organized yet 
unpredictable nature of gang violence (Lorentz, 2010). In its present state, the 
inefficiencies that exist in SPD’s information and communications architecture create 
more opportunities for the criminals and reduce the tactical advantage for the SPD. This 
must change.  
The above situation has severely hampered SPD in its ability to move forward in 
ways that will leverage the fight against crime in its favor. Of the potential solutions to 
these problems, the two most consequential towards SPD’s crime fighting abilities are:  
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1. Acceptance: Continue with business as usual and wait for either better 
economic times or additional grant funding to support capability 
improvements, or 
2. Adoption: Make better use of its existing Information and 
Communications capabilities in ways that enhance officer effectiveness.  
This thesis focuses on the second option, and explains how aligning SPD’s 
current capabilities to that of a JBAIIC-like architecture (discussed in Chapter I.B.1.) will 
help SPD reclaim the streets of Salinas from the deeply entrenched gang population.  
B. FORMATION OF THE NPS/SPD WORKING GROUP 
In December 2008, due to the increasing number of homicides in Salinas caused 
by a deeply rooted gang population, the Provost of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
requested that the NPS Defense Analysis (DA) Department provide assistance to the city 
of Salinas due to their expertise in irregular warfare (H. Rothstein, personal 
communication, September 21, 2010). Throughout the next year, representatives from the 
DA Department and the city of Salinas worked together to create courses of action to 
reduce gang violence. In August 2010, members of the NPS Department of Information 
Sciences joined the working group to aid in the fight against the rising crime in Salinas. 
From the Information Sciences Department, the Distributed Information Systems 
Experimentation Research Group (DISE) and its Intelligence Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance (ISR) field experimentation team, the Joint Battlespace Awareness ISR 
Integration Capability, (JBAIIC), formed a Technical Working Group (TWG) focused on 
identifying a viable, usable, and affordable solution to improve the Situational Awareness 
(SA) of the officers of the Salinas Police Department. According to JBAIIC’s Project 
Team Leader,  
The [Technical] Working Group will be comprised of gang enforcement 
officers, field supervisors, communication (dispatch) professionals, and 
mid-level managers in addition to NPS personnel. The [technical] working 
group will provide input to NPS in accurately identifying a critical 
capability gap and that the proposed solution is operationally sound and 
would be reasonably likely to solve this gap. (B. Wood, personal 
communication, September 14, 2010) 
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1. JBAIIC—Joint Battlespace Awareness ISR Integration Capability  
JBAIIC, is a field experimentation initiative that ensures, “ISR data collected—
regardless of sensor, source or communications transport—is processed and exploited, 
making it available immediately to joint and coalition war fighters” (LeCappelain, 2010). 
The JBAIIC infrastructure consists of an experimentation lab located in Root Hall at 
NPS, three deployable trailers and one Mobile Command Post vehicle—the Joint 
Reconfigurable Vehicle (JRV). These assets allow the JBAIIC team to design, test, and 
overcome realistic battlefield ISR integration challenges that face deployed military units. 
The mobile trailers provide JBAIIC autonomous capabilities creating ‘sensor to shooter’ 
networks, allowing them to function as both a Tactical Operations Center (TOC) and 
Network Operations Center (NOC). As a result, JBAIIC is able to provide Command and 
Control1 (C2) and Situational Awareness2 (SA) for personnel at the TOC and those 
deployed to the tactical edge—the battlefield. With the ability to ‘simulate’ the entire 
information and communications process that exists on the battlefield, JBAIIC is 
uniquely able to test potential technologies to ensure they are able to provide the services 
needed by the military.  
2. Initial Project Plan 
After several meetings, the TWG identified the lack of a Common Tactical 
Picture (CTP)3 as the most significant gap in SPD’s architecture. To resolve this 
                                                 
1 Command and Control (C2) is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated 
commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. C2 functions are 
performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures 
employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the 
accomplishment of the mission. (DOD Dictionary of Military Terms, 2011). 
2 Battlespace Awareness is the “knowledge and understanding of the operational area's environment, 
factors, and conditions, to include the status of friendly and adversary forces, neutrals and noncombatants, 
weather and terrain, that enables timely, relevant, comprehensive, and accurate assessments, in order to 
successfully apply combat power, protect the force, and/or complete the mission (DOD Dictionary of 
Military Terms, 2011). The term joint refers to those supporting partners such as coalition (foreign) or other 
U.S. service forces who are equally invested in the current action and therefore also need Situational 
Awareness. 
3 A Common Tactical Picture is “An accurate and complete display of relevant tactical data that 
integrates tactical information from the multi-tactical data link network, ground network, intelligence 
network, and sensor networks” (Common Tactical Picture, 2011). An Interactive Common Tactical Picture 
(I-CTP) is a CTP that is configured to accept user input.  
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deficiency, JBAIIC technicians tentatively planned two demonstrations to highlight how 
a Common Tactical Picture can enhance SA for SPD. The first demonstration, Demo #1, 
employed military technology to highlight a ‘what is possible’ while the second 
demonstration, Demo #2, would incorporate commercial technology to create a CTP that 
could be directly implemented by SPD. Table 1 shows the three phases of the project 
prior to Demo #1: 
 
PHASE I 
1. Analysis of current capabilities  
2. Report project timeline  
3. Establish a working group  
a. Identify equipment for Demonstration # 1 
b. Identify the equipment for Demonstration #2 (CTP Demo) 
PHASE II 
4. Demo #2 (CTP) for routine police operations 
5. Demo #2 (CTP) for non routine operations 
PHASE III 
6. Solicitation for industry participation for Phase III technology capability  
demonstration 
7. Host technology capability meeting to determine the exact range of sensor input 
possibilities for inclusion in the final demonstration 
8. Final CTP Demonstration  
Table 1.   Project Plan (From B. Wood, personal communication,  
September 14, 2010) 
a. Revised Project Plan 
Shortly after completing the first demonstration, further analysis into 
SPD’s architecture revealed that implementing a complete CTP was not in the best 
interest of SPD. There are many reasons for this. First, implementing Blue Force 
Tracking would require the NPS team to install either GPS or cellular devices on all 
patrol cars as well as configure the display on digital maps at the dispatch center. Due to 
two technological initiatives already in progress though, SPD would be able to implement 
BFT within the next year. Secondly, a CTP would need to be installed at the dispatch 
center to display the BFT position tracks. The dispatch center is not dedicated to SPD 
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alone, but instead supports every public safety agency in Monterey County. While 
technologically feasible, the efforts to properly integrate into this jointly used facility 
would need to consider the system impacts for all users, which is beyond the scope of this 
project. Finally, to display the position data, NPS would need to integrate this data into 
the the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system at the dispatch center. However, this 
system is scheduled for replacement within three years. This means that any effort to 
integrate with the CAD would be short lived once the current system was replaced. With 
a police force still adjusting to recent reductions and several technological initiatives 
planned over the next year, SPD requested assistance with assessing its architecture as 
well as any recommendations for how to move forward from its present state. 
Researchers agreed with the modification listed in Table 2.  
 
PHASE I 
1. Analysis of current capabilities  - Completed, Demo #1 
2. Report project timeline  - Completed, Demo #1 
3. Establish a working group  - Completed, Demo #1 
a. Phase I - Identify the “equipment” for Demonstration # 1 - Completed, Demo #1 
b. Phase I—Complete Demonstration #1 of CTP capability - Completed, Demo #1 
PHASE II 
4. Complete architectural analysis of SPD primary capabilities of a JBAIIC architecture 
5. Identify capability gaps  
PHASE III 
6. Create a Technology Implementation Plan and Courses of Action  
Table 2.   Revised Project Plan 
To accomplish this, researchers compare SPD’s architecture to the 
architecture of JBAIIC and then provide recommendations to reduce capability gaps. 
Based on the results of this analysis and the technological initiatives already planned, a 
Technology Implementation Plan (TIP) would recommend potential courses of action for 
SPD in order to implement an architecture capable to combating the existing gang threat.  
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis answers the following three questions:  
• How can elements from the JBAIIC test bed knowledge base be adapted to 
the existing information architecture used by SPD to enhance its crime 
fighting strategies?  
• How will members of SPD successfully implement the JBAIIC 
architecture?  
• How could other municipal governments facing similar issues with high 
crime and constrained resources apply the architecture created for Salinas 
to extend the effectiveness of its police force?  
1. Benefits of the Study 
The implementation of an NPS-sponsored IT solution to real-life problems in a 
neighboring city will have a direct and beneficial impact on the citizens of Salinas and 
the Monterey Peninsula. The recent economic downturn and high crime rates have 
created an ideal time to leverage NPS research capabilities to implement IT measures that 
have already proven themselves overseas in the fight against deeply rooted insurgents 
employing irregular warfare tactics. After having identified the gaps in the existing 
information and communications architecture, NPS will be able to create a solid IT 
foundation on which to promote future research efforts. Finally, the methods used to 
employ a JBAIIC architecture for this research effort can be generalized and conveyed to 
other municipalities facing similar threats and resource constraints, allowing them to 
extend the capabilities of their limited resources.  
2. Specific Research Objective 
For the purposes of this study, the research objective is to use the JBAIIC 
architecture as a method to enhance the effectiveness of the capabilities of the Salinas 
Police Department. Specifically, given the current state of affairs in Salinas, the JBAIIC 
architecture model is used to identify both the capability gaps and those actions that the 
Salinas Police Department needs to take to achieve to prevent or attenuate the threats it 
currently faces.  
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II. METHODOLOGY 
This research effort encompasses the alignment of the current architecture of SPD 
with that of a JBAIIC-like architecture to enhance officer effectiveness. To do this, the 
functional capabilities of SPD’s architecture are compared to architectural elements of a 
JBAIIC architecture. Upon completion, any gaps identified from this analysis are 
incorporated into a Technology Implementation Plan (TIP) that recommends three 
courses of action considering the capability gaps as well as those IT initiatives currently 
in planned by SPD. This thesis encompasses a broad range of technologies but focuses 
only on those technologies that are believed to have the greatest impact on officer 
effectiveness. Due to the number of technologies being evaluated, this thesis does not 
delve into the specific technical issues surrounding the integration of any one technology, 
but instead focuses on how various technologies will impact the architecture of SPD to 
achieve Command and Control and Battlespace Awareness. The intent is that this thesis 
will be used as a strategic foundation of learning for SPD, allowing it to confidently and 
safely pursue enhancements to present capabilities, given its extensive resource 
limitations. The primary steps taken in the completion of this thesis include:  
• Attending working group meetings between NPS and the city of Salinas  
• Preparing for and participating in a Technology Demonstration in October 
2010 
• Assisting with the creation of information architecture drawings  
• Documenting changes to the baseline JBAIIC architecture resulting in a 
best fit architecture for SPD 
• Conducting a literature search for studies concerning various technology 
implementation initiatives in the Law Enforcement community 
• Conducting interviews with members of SPD 
• Performing inquiries with other California emergency service 
organizations that have implemented similar technologies for possible 
lessons learned and recommendations (e.g., biometrics, ShotSpotter, etc.).  
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A. JBAIIC’S INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS ARCHITECTURE 
The JBAIIC architectural model consists of six elements as identified in Figure 1. 
These elements, when integrated together, allow JBAIIC to obtain Command and Control 
and Battlespace Awareness as indicated by the green arrows pointing to the center. The 
following sections detail the explanations of each element.  
 
 
Figure 1.   The JBAIIC Architectural Model 
1. Sensors 
Sensors are a key component of a JBAIIC-type architecture. Sensors of varying 
types are used to capture and relay information back to the Tactical Operations Center 
(TOC) for analysis and for inclusion in the Integrated Common Tactical Picture (I-CTP). 
Characteristics of a JBAIIC sensor include providing persistent sensing and adequate 
coverage of the battlespace. Examples of sensors used by JBAIIC to support recent 
research efforts include:  
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• Motion and Acoustic Sensors: Capable of locating movement, e.g., radars, 
such as Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), NanoSAR, Spotter RF radar, and 
ShotSpotter’s Gunshot Location System (GLS).  
• Optical Sensors: Detect thermal radiation or tacking pictures, e.g., 
Forward Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR) 
• Seismic Sensors: Detect ground movement, e.g., Unattended Ground 
Sensors (UGS) 
• UAS/UAV (Unmanned Aircraft System/Unmanned Aerial Vehicles): 
Mobile platforms capable of hosting a myriad of individual sensors, e.g., 
Predator and Scan Eagle drones.  
• Aerostats: Moored balloons hosting a sensor platform 
2. Blue Force Tracking 
Blue Force Tracking (BFT) is a “United States military term used to denote a 
GPS-enabled system that provides military commanders and forces with location 
information” of friendly units ("BFT", 2011).  BFT allows the Tactical Operations Center 
(TOC) to remain cognizant of deployed force locations including ground and air assets. 
Characteristics of BFT, as implemented by JBAIIC, include a GPS enabled device that is 
deployed on all assets and personnel. JBAIIC implements BFT by utilizing GPS enabled 
devices, such as tactical radios. The position data is then pushed to the TOC for display 
on an I-CTP.  
3. Mobile Data Sharing Device (MDSD) 
In the context of a JBAIIC architecture, Mobile Data Sharing Devices (MDSD) 
are ruggedized portable devices used to send, receive, and process information. Other 
characteristics of MDSDs are that they support both classified and unclassified data 
transfer, fully function in a bandwidth limited environment, and support data push,4 pull5 
                                                 
4 Data push commonly refers to a client server architecture in which data is “pushed” to a user's device 
rather than “pulled” by the user. In other words, the data transfer is initiated by the server rather than the 
client (Push, 2011). For the purposes of this report however, the meaning of Push indicates the ability to 
upload data to the network. 
5 Data pull is where data transfer is initiated by the client rather than the server. For the purposes of 
this report, the meaning of Pull indicates the ability to download data from the network.  
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and sharing.6 Examples of MDSDs used by JBAIIC in both Empire Challenge 2009 and 
2010 include: the Panasonic Toughbook (both CF-19 & CF-U1), Trimble’s Nomad, 
General Dynamic’s MR-1, SNC’s Tacticomp T1.5 & T5, and the handheld Lockheed 
Martin Distributed Operations (DisOPS). These devices can be used to support numerous 
operational needs such as mission planning, Chat, VOIP (Voice Over Internet Protocol) 
communications, BFT monitoring, viewing maps, capturing and forwarding video, and 
providing simultaneous access to the CTP. Depending on the experiment, MDSDs may 
be used in either a fixed, mounted, and/or dismounted capacity and will need to be 
capable of line-of-sight or satellite communications, or both. This allows both deployed 
forces and the TOC to remain cognizant of nearby threats, reducing the response time to 
enemy actions.  
4. Mobile Command Post 
For deployed forces without direct satellite communications, there needs to be a 
means of getting data to and from the TOC and between other forces over the horizon. 
This is the job of the Mobile Command Post (MCP).  A MCP is a deployable mobile 
platform that has more robust communications and information systems than those of the 
deployed forces. An MCP must be able to support both classified and unclassified data 
traffic, have the ability to communicate directly with the TOC, and possess redundant 
communications capabilities. An MCP extends the viewable battlespace by providing a 
means for the deployed forces with reduced communications capabilities, to relay 
information to the TOC. The MCP acts as a sensor point of entry and provides an 
interface to numerous networks. With a direct connection to the TOC, an MCP allows 
deployed forces to access more of the battlespace further enhancing Situational 
Awareness (SA).  Figure 2 shows JBAIIC’s MCP called the Joint Reconfigurable Vehicle 
(JRV).  
 
                                                 
6 Information sharing is synonymous with “peer to peer,” which means that computers are able to 
share data directly between themselves without the use of a server. The term “share” is used here because 




Figure 2.   JBAIIC’s Mobile Command Post the Joint Reconfigurable Vehicle (JRV) 
USJFCOM photo by Staff Sgt. Vanessa Valentin, USAF 
5. Network 
The network component of the JBAIIC architecture is composed of the data paths 
that connect the sensor network to the MDSDs, MCPs, and TOC in addition to external 
communities of interest. Successfully resolving these one to many - many to one 
networking challenges is very complicated and is what makes JBAIIC so unique among 
military IT integration platforms. To fulfill its mission as an autonomous Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) test bed, a JBAIIC architecture usually consists 
of numerous classified and unclassified networks. These networks, or enclaves, are 
configured to allow low to high cross-domain data sharing of everything from chat 
communications, sensor data, to CTP data. Figure 3 shows an example of a JBAIIC 
network created to provide a Secure Network Server,7 Cross Domain Solution as part of 
Empire Challenge8 2009 (EC, 2009). Table 3 lists the security domains that supported EC 
2009. 
                                                 
7 Secure Network Server (SNS) is a Cross Domain Solution developed by Boeing that supports 
bidirectional data sharing among multiple security enclaves (Irvine, 2009). 
8 Empire Challenge is an annual U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) led multinational ISR 
demonstration that showcases emerging capabilities and provides lessons learned to improve joint and 
combined ISR interoperability (LeCappelain, 2010). 
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Figure 3.   JBAIIC Architecture for Secure Network Server, Cross Domain Solution 
as Part of Empire Challenge 2009 (From Garza, 2009) 
Security Domains Supported by SNS in EC09
Security Domain Classification Level 
Virtual Private Network (VPN) Unclassified 
Community Of Interest (COI) Unclassified 
Coalition Four Eyes (CFE) Secret, Coalition 
Distributed Development and Test Enterprise (DDTE) Secret, U.S. only 
Table 3.   Security Domains as Part of Secure Network Server, Cross Domain 
Solution 
In addition to configuring the physical devices that host the network, the JBAIIC 
team has to integrate the communications links connecting tactical devices. Elements 
commonly incorporated into a JBAIIC network for field experimentation include a 
tactical satellite and secure wireless, typically UHF, VHF, or commercial 3G/4G cellular. 
The proper configuration of a JBAIIC network is essential for testing emerging ISR 
capabilities. 
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6. Tactical Operations Center (TOC) and Interactive—Common 
Tactical Picture (I-CTP) 
The Tactical Operations Center (TOC) is the ‘brains’ of any modern warfighting 
effort. At the TOC, sensor and intelligence data are fused together to create an I-CTP 
which provides battlespace awareness that operational commanders need to exercise C2 
over their forces. Once created, the CTP can then be pushed to tactical units deployed 
throughout the battlespace for display at either Mobile Command Posts or on individual 
Mobile Data Sharing Devices. Essential characteristics of a JBAIIC TOC include:  
• The ability to receive classified and unclassified sensor data,  
• Hosts a CTP available to both internal and external users, and  
• Employs analysts who are focused on synthesizing sensor data to create 
actionable intelligence. 
To create the CTP, JBAIIC uses the MITRE Cursor on Target (CoT)9 technology.  
“CoT translates metadata from ISR systems and sensors into a common message format 
for display on the CTP. The images received at the TOC are embedded in CoT messages. 
These image messages are normally displayed as camera icons on the FalconView CTP 
display. The user can access these images by clicking on the icon” (Irvine, 2011). Being 
able to access the location of friendly and enemy forces on a CTP greatly enhances the 
SA of the community of users.  
As an autonomous ISR integration test bed, JBAIIC is specifically equipped to 
perform the duties of the TOC. To fulfill this role, JBAIIC utilizes three mobile 
platforms: Joint Mission Support Modules #1 (JMSM-1), #2 (JMSM-2), and #3 (JMSM-
3). JMSM-1 functions as a Network Operations Center (NOC); JMSM-2 provides the C2 
displays for SA and fulfills the role of TOC; and JMSM-3 is a workshop that supports 
both JMSM-1 and JMSM-2. Figure 4 shows the interior of the JBAIIC TOC (JMSM-2) 
and Figure 5 displays how TOC and CTP integrate within the JBAIIC infrastructure.  
                                                 
9 CoT is a “MITRE-developed XML methodology for communicating essential battlefield information 
(where, when, and what) between otherwise non interoperable systems and is the mechanism employed by 
JBAIIC for ISR integration (Irvine, 2009).” 
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Figure 4.   Interior of the JMSM-2 TOC on August 12, 2010. Photo by JBAIIC (From 
Irvine, 2009) 
Table 4 summarizes the characteristics of a JBAIIC architecture. These 
characteristics were used to determine how SPD’s architecture compares to JBAIIC’s 
architecture. Following Table 4, Figure 5 provides an overview of the JBAIIC 
Infrastructure as detailed in the previous pages. 
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JBAIIC Architecture Characteristics of the JBAIIC Architecture Elements10 
Sensors 1. Sensors provide persistent monitoring of battlespace 
2. Enough sensors are deployed to cover the battlespace 
 
Blue Force Tracking 
(BFT) 
1. Implemented with GPS 
2. Deployed on all assets and personnel 
Mobile Data Sharing 
Devices (MDSD) 
1. Must support both classified and unclassified transfer of data 
2. Supports ‘Push, Pull, & Share’ of data (as defined in section II) 
3. Fully functions in bandwidth limited environment 
4. Ruggedized design 
Mobile Command Post 
(MCP) 
1. Must support both classified and unclassified transfer of data 
2. Direct communications with local units and Tactical Operations Center (TOC) 
3. Redundant communications 
4. Must be fully operational 
Network 1. Support classified and unclassified communications: 
a. audio,  
b. video, and  
c. data  
2. Must be able to communicate with coalition partners 
Tactical Operations 
Center (TOC) with 
Interactive Common 
Tactical Picture (I-CTP) 
1. Able to receive classified and unclassified data from sensor network 
2. Receives input from all elements of the JBAIIC architecture 
3. Displayable for local and external uses  
4. Full time analysts who fuse sensor data into actionable intelligence 
 
Table 4.   Summary of JBAIIC Architectural Characteristics 
                                                 
10 For the purposes of this study, the requirement of JBAIIC architecture elements to support classified and unclassified data will be deemed to be 
met by SPD capabilities able to support secure (encryption) and non-secure modes of data transport.  
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Figure 5.   JBAIIC Infrastructure 
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In addition to possessing the six elements identified in the JBAIIC model, each 
element must be integrated with the others. It is through the integration of these elements 
that ultimately results in a JBAIIC architecture capable of providing Command and 
Control and Battlespace Awareness at both the TOC and among the deployed field units. 
For the purposes of this study, assessing the level of integration of SPD’s architecture 
includes only a relative determination of the overall architecture’s ability to access data 
as it relates to a JBAIIC architecture. The terms push, pull, and share are used to 
demonstrate a relative level of overall system integration. Figure 6 displays the author’s 
interpretation of three types of system integration, which include Non Integrated, 





Figure 6.   Venn Diagram Identifying Relative Levels of IT System Integration Non 
Integrated, Partially Integrated, and Fully Integrated 
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Together, the architectural model (Figure 1) and those capabilities listed in Table 
4 make up the baseline JBAIIC architecture, which was used to assess SPD’s 
architectural capabilities. By comparing its capabilities to that of the JBAIIC architecture, 
SPD will be able to identify those capability gaps that are limiting its ability to achieve 
Command and Control and Battlespace Awareness on the streets of Salinas. Once 
identified, SPD will be able to create a plan of action allowing them to achieve the 
benefits of the JBAIIC architecture which include the ability to “access, aggregate, 
disseminate, and display key information at the tactical edge to provide improved 
situational awareness and facilitate more effective decisions” (Irvine, 2009). 
B. JBAIIC’S ARCHITECTURE FOR SEAL TEAM EIGHT 
To ensure SPD’s architecture is able to combat violent crime, it must be aligned 
with an architecture best suited for that purpose. The JBAIIC information and 
communication architecture (from now on referred to as the ‘JBAIIC architecture’) is 
such an architecture.  
A JBAIIC architecture was recently created for Seal Team EIGHT to support 
wartime operations. Figure 7 shows how an architectural model can be used to combat a 
specific threat. Specifically, in the case of Seal Team EIGHT, the architectural model 




Figure 7.   How an Architectural Model Is Used to Address Threats. 
Figures 8 and 9 show two different views of a JBAIIC architecture created to 
support Seal Team EIGHT.  Figure 8 demonstrates how tactical units using secure radios 
can relay real time information to a TOC via an MCP for use in creating I-CTP to achieve 




Figure 8.   JBAIIC Architecture View #1—Seal Team EIGHT (From Roeting, 2010)
Figure 8 Acronyms 
BGAN: Broadband Global Area Network (e.g., 
INMARSAT Service) 
INMARSAT: International Maritime Satellite 
Communications  
LOS: Line-of-sight 
MCP: Mobile Command Post  
MDSD: Mobile Data Sharing Device 
PRC-152: Tactical Radio made by Harris Radio 
PRC-117G: Tactical Radio made by Harris Radio 
SNC Meshnet: A “fault-tolerant high-performance 
local area network” that utilizes SNC 
communications devices (Kulkarni, Malaiya, & 
Jayasumana, 1989). 
SNC T5.0 Tactical Tablet Mobile Data Sharing 
Devices (MDSD) made by SNC  
SNC T1.5: Tactical Handheld Mobile Data 
Sharing Devices (MDSD) made by SNC  
SNC: Sierra Nevada Corporation 
TOC w/ I-CTP: Tactical Operations Center with 




Figure 9.   JBAIIC Architecture View #2—Seal Team EIGHT (From Roeting, 
2010) 
Figure 9 Acronyms 
AT-FLIR (Advanced Targeting—Forward 
Looking Infrared Radar): An aircraft mounted 
radar sensor made by Raytheon 
BFT: Blue Force Tracker 
FMV: Full Motion Video 
ISR: Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance  
Rover: Remotely Operated Video Enhanced Receiver 
Tactical ISR: A deployable ISR sensor 
UGS: Unattended Ground Sensor 
VAP: Virtual Access Point—A wireless devices that 
provides network access to deployed forces 
 
Figure 9 shows how sensors can be integrated into this architecture, enabling real-
time information sharing between deployed forces equipped with Mobile Data Sharing 
Devices (MDSD) and the TOC. The yellow cones originating from the airborne sensors 
(AT-FLIR) identify hostile targets.  This data is relayed to ground forces and displayed 
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on MDSDs such as the Sierra Nevada Corporation’s (SNC) T5 tablet or T1.5 handheld 
device. These figures demonstrate the power behind a fully integrated JBAIIC 
architecture. Once implemented, this architecture allowed Seal Team EIGHT to achieve 
‘sensor to shooter’ decision timelines for both the tactical units and the TOC.  
Figure 10 shows the final JBAIIC architecture created for Seal Team EIGHT.  For 
assessment purposes, green check marks were used to indicate that a given capability 
does contribute to the architectures overall ability to achieve C2 and SA.  Red Xs indicate 
that a given capability does not contribute to the architectures overall ability to achieve 
C2 and SA and constitutes a capability gap.  Those capabilities listed in the off-white 
center section are those most critical to achieving the characteristics of a JBAIIC 
architecture.  By aligning its capabilities to that of the JBAIIC baseline architecture, Seal 




Figure 10.   JBAIIC Architecture for Seal Team EIGHT 
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C. SPD-JBAIIC ARCHITECTURE - DEMONSTRATION #1  
1. Concept and Setup 
To demonstrate how a JBAIIC architecture can result in both improved command 
and control and battlespace awareness, researchers from the Naval Postgraduate School 
conducted a field demonstration for SPD on October 14, 2010, in Salinas, California. By 
using GPS-enabled Mobile Data Sharing Devices, researchers demonstrated the 
advantage of being able to observe officer locations via Blue Force Tracking, on a CTP 
during the response to two scenario-based events in different locations. Researches 
initially selected SPD’s headquarters, Figure 11(a), and the dispatch center, Figure 11(b), 
as the locations for the demonstrations. Upon the completion of site surveys researchers 




(a). Dispatch Center Aerial View 
(b). Salinas Police Department Aerial View 




Figure 12.   Initial JBAIIC Network Architecture for Demonstration #1 Diagram created by Bob Garza, JBAIIC 
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Prior to the demonstration, the dispatch center became unavailable to stage the 
experiment. This required shifting this portion of the demonstration to the Salinas Fire 
Department (SFD) Abbott Street Fire Station (Figure 13). The TOC was set up in the fire 
station training room and the Mobile Command Vehicle (MCV), acting as an MCP, was 
deployed across the street from SPD headquarters.  To connect the MCP to the TOC, 
researchers erected a 65-foot omni-directional antenna connected to a Harris PRC-117G 
tactical radio at each site to provide a line-of-sight communications link.  Due to the 
change in venue researchers adjusted the network diagram to accommodate the change in 
location (Figure 14).  At the TOC, two CTPs displayed the outputs of the MDSDs, 
allowing SPD observers in the TOC to view both scenarios. Furthermore, officers 
participating in the scenario would be able to monitor the situation from a CTP being 
pushed to their handheld devices from the TOC.  Researchers crafted two scenarios 
(conducted twice each) for the demonstration. Prior to the start of each scenario, 
participating officers were each issued a GPS-enabled SNC handheld device so that 
officer locations could be displayed on the CTP at the TOC.   
a. Scenario #1 
The first scenario took place in a parking lot at SPD Headquarters. It 
involved officers responding to a report of a suspicious person.  A researcher acting as a 
bystander observed a suspicious person, and simulated calling 911 by briefing real 
dispatchers participating in the scenario.  Upon receiving the 911 call, the dispatcher sent 
a participating officer to the scene.  Once on scene, the officer requested backup. Once 
backup arrived, both officers approached the suspicious person. The primary officer 
placed the individual under arrest and escorted him to the rear of SPD. The scenario was 
then repeated. 
b. Scenario #2 
The second scenario occurred simultaneously with Scenario #1, but across 
town at the Abbott Street Fire Station. This scenario involved a simulated drive-by 
shooting. In this scenario, an armed assailant shot a person but then remained in the area 
for an unknown reason. An observer reported the incident to the dispatch center. Two 
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SPD units, each with BFT enabled mobile devices, and an ambulance (simulated) were 
dispatched to the scene. Once on scene, the officers took the suspicious person into 
custody. The victim, seeing that he was only shot in the foot, refused medical assistance 
and was escorted back to the Fire Station training room, concluding the scenario. All 
participants in Scenario #2 gathered in the SFD training room for a debriefing. The 
participants then repeated the scenario.  
After both scenarios were completed twice, researchers conducted a mass 
debriefing inside the TOC at SFD. Here, data collectors interviewed scenario participants 
about their experience with the Mobile Data Sharing Devices, and asked whether 





(a). Salinas Fire Department, Aerial View 
 
(b). Salinas Police Department, Aerial View 
Figure 13.   Site Locations for JBAIIC’s Field Demonstration 
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2. Final Architecture and Challenges 
Throughout the preparation and execution of this effort, many challenges and 
lessons were learned. Prior to the demonstration, the most significant challenge involved 
coordinating the participation and resource use of both the city of Salinas and Monterey 
County public safety agencies resulting in significant changes to the initial network 
architecture (Figure 12) and the final network architecture (Figure 14). For example, the 
change in location, from the dispatch center to SFD, significantly impacted the network 
and communication aspects of the demonstration. The roof of the dispatch center 
provided an optimal height that enabled the communications antennas to connect to the 
Mobile Data Sharing Devices distributed throughout the two site locations. At the Fire 
Station, the tower used to mount the antennas provided a lower antenna height, which 




Figure 14.   Final JBAIIC Network Architecture Demonstration #1 (Diagram created by Bob Garza, JBAIIC) 
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Of the many challenges that surfaced during the demonstration, the two most 
significant ones were:  
• maintaining adequate signal strength between the two PRC-117G radios at 
SPD and SFD sites, and  
• resolving the significant delays (up to 10 seconds) in the refresh rates of 
the icons that identified the location of the officers. This resulted in the 
CTP ‘lagging’ behind the actual events as heard on the radios. 
We believe that the poor signal strength and long refresh rates were the result of:  
• the maximum available height of each antenna resulting in a less than 
optimum line-of-sight between the two nodes,  
• urban interference caused by the surrounding buildings, and 
• environmental interference caused by strong winds and warm local 
temperatures.  
3. Results of Demonstration #1 
Despite the challenges, SPD officers involved in the scenarios were able to 
observe how BFT, when implemented into a CTP, provides enhanced SA to those at the 
TOC. For example, one officer stated that a CTP with BFT would not only be 
advantageous to local officers but would be essential for providing SA to officers who are 
responding from other jurisdictions—such as the County Sheriff’s Department—who 
may not be familiar with the local area (Officer #5, personal communication, October 14, 
2010).  
Figure 15 is the JBAIIC Architectural model created for this demonstration. It 
identifies which capabilities of SPD, SFD, and JBAIIC team result in achieving C2 and 
Battlespace Awareness.  
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Figure 15.   Final JBAIIC Architecture Model, Demonstration #1 
While effective, the model in Figure 15 is not a practical solution for SPD 
because the military tactical radios are cost prohibitive and not ubiquitous among SPD 
partner agencies throughout Monterey County. To create a Salinas-specific JBAIIC 
architecture, the author completed an analysis of the current architecture of both SPD and 
a typical street gang. By doing this, the author was able to create a JBAIIC-type 
architecture that can exceed the capabilities of the violent criminals in Salinas.  
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D. SALINAS, CALIFORNIA, AND THE SALINAS POLICE DEPARTMENT 
1. Salinas, California 
Salinas, California, is located approximately 10 miles northeast of Monterey, 
California, and 100 miles south of San Francisco (Figure 16). The city is an agricultural 
center, 23 square miles in size, and produces nearly 80 percent of the lettuce in the U.S. 
("Salinas California", 2011). The 2009 population of Salinas was 152,597, composed of 
70 percent Hispanic, 18 percent White, 2 percent Asian, 1 percent African American, and 
9 percent other (Long, 2010). 
 
 
Figure 16.   Salinas, California 
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2. The Salinas Police Department 
The Salinas Police Department (SPD) is headquartered at 222 Lincoln Avenue 
(just off of Main Street) in historic downtown Salinas. As of February 18, 2011, SPD had 
156 sworn officers, 59 full time and 15 part time staff, 13 reserve officers, and 16 
volunteers. Excluding the executive staff, these personnel are distributed into three 
divisions: Investigations, Police Services, and Field Operations as shown in Figure 17.  
 
 
Figure 17.   Formal Organization of SPD 
SPD’s organizational structure allows it to respond to the various needs associated 
with maintaining the peace in Salinas. To provide the services associated with public 
safety, SPD relies on a core set of tools, equipment, and technology to assist all officers 
in the performance of their duties.  
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In a typical day, officers, especially patrol officers, use the following 
equipment:11  
• Patrol Car with vehicle-mounted mobile data terminal (MDT) 
• Radio that is vehicle mounted and portable 
• Magnetic Voice Recorders 
• Cell Phones12  
• Field interview forms and various other paper forms 
• Standard issue police gear (personal weapon, handcuffs, note pad, body 
armor, etc.) 
3. Patrol Operations 
The Field Operations Division employs approximately 51% of the current SPD 
work force and primarily performs duties of first responder by patrolling the streets of 
Salinas. Patrol officers are separated into one of four 10-hour patrol shifts to patrol the 12 
patrol zones or beats (Appendix). Due to recent reductions in forces, SPD routinely 
dispatches fewer officers than there are patrol beats (Table 5). Additionally, operations 
may necessitate multiple officers patrolling the same beat, or one officer being assigned 
to multiple beats (Officer #7, personal communication, January 26, 2011).  
                                                 
11 This equipment list is specific to the equipment and technology routinely used by patrol officers. 
SPD does possess additional equipment needed for specific purposes such as analyzing a crime scene or 
technology used by the computer forensics team. While essential to conducting specific elements of police 
work, these types of specialty equipment exceed the scope of this research effort and are not included in the 
analysis of SPD’s architecture.  
12 Issuing cell phones to all patrol officers would be cost prohibitive. Currently cell phones are issued 
to those personnel whose official duties necessitate frequent access to cell phones such as investigators, 
Watch Commanders, and various supervisors, etc. Patrol officers needing to make a phone call have the 







Minimum Staffing Levels for Beat Patrols 
Shift Time Weekdays Weekends Special Events  
1st watch 10 Hrs: 07:30 am to 5:30 pm 11 * 11 * 
If additional officers are needed for special events, they are 
hired at their overtime rate and assigned to the event—rather 
than to patrol a beat.  
William watch 10 Hrs: 03:00 pm to 1:00 am 11 *, ** 14 *, ** 
2nd watch  10 Hrs: 05:00 pm to 3:00 am
3rd watch 10 Hrs: 10:00 pm to 8:00 am 10* 11 * 
          
* Since there are more patrol zones than available patrol officers some are assigned to patrol more than one beat 
** The William watch is a subset of the 2nd watch and is composed of approximately six officers who report to work two hours before 
the 2nd watch to assist with case and call backlogs typically experienced by the 1st watch throughout the day. This is to ensure that the 
1st watch can depart work at the end of the assigned shift.  












Requests for assistance, or calls for service, are received by the dispatch center. 
Typically, officers are dispatched to an incident location corresponding to the beat they 
are patrolling. Current policy requires a two-officer response for all emergency calls and 
one for routine calls. Recent reductions in patrol forces have impacted SPD’s ability to 
meet this two officer response requirement. Depending on the call load of other patrol 
officers, back up assistance may not be readily available, requiring an officer to respond 
on his or her own (R. Perrien, personal communication, February 24, 2011). When this 
occurs, the dispatcher will contact the Patrol Supervisor to determine if an officer should 
be pulled off a less important call (R. Perrien, 2011). The current fiscal crisis has forced 
SPD to severely restrict officer responses to non-emergencies. For example, officers are 
no longer dispatched for:  
• minor non-injury traffic collisions 
• civil (child custody) matters 
• minor nuisance calls, etc.  
Additionally, “ low priority calls for service are being screened more closely to determine 
if a police officer is really needed at the scene” (Fetherolf, 2010).  
Due to the similarities between patrol officers and military infantry—concerning 
their first response capability, autonomous nature, and the need for SA—the analysis of 
SPD’s architecture focused on those elements that would best support the efforts of the 
patrol officer. Additionally, with more than 50% of the sworn officers performing patrol 
duties, it is the author’s belief that aligning a JBAIIC-like architecture with the needs of 
the patrol officer would result in the most significant improvements for SPD as a whole.  
4. A Typical Gang’s Communications and Information Architecture 
It first must be understood what capabilities criminals currently use to coordinate 
their activities before attempting to implement a JBAIIC-type architecture so that it can 




Gang members often use cell phones and the Internet to communicate and 
promote their illicit activities. Street gangs typically use the voice and text 
messaging capabilities of cell phones to conduct drug transactions and 
prearrange meetings with customers. Members of street gangs use multiple 
cell phones that they frequently discard while conducting their drug 
trafficking operations. For example, the leader of an African American 
street gang operating on the north side of Milwaukee used more than 20 
cell phones to coordinate drug-related activities of the gang; most were 
prepaid phones that the leader routinely discarded and replaced. Internet-
based methods such as social networking sites, encrypted e-mail, Internet 
telephony, and instant messaging are commonly used by gang members to 
communicate with one another and with drug customers. Gang members 
use social networking Internet sites such as MySpace, YouTube, and 
Facebook as well as personal web pages to communicate and boast about 
their gang membership and related activities. According to open source 
and local law enforcement reporting, members of “Crips” gangs in 
Hampton, Virginia, use the Internet to intimidate rival gang members and 
maintain web sites to recruit new members. On October 23, 2007, a 15-
year-old Crips gang member was arrested for shooting a rival gang 
member in the leg. Additionally, he was charged with the recruitment of 
persons for a criminal street gang through the use of the gang's social 
networking site. Gangs in Oceanside, California, are recruiting new 
members and claiming new turf on the Internet. Gang members flash gang 
signs and wear gang colors in videos and photos displayed on Internet 
sites. Sometimes, rivals “spar” on Internet message boards. Oceanside 
Police Department officers who investigate the city's resident “Crips” and 
“Bloods,” easily find well-produced, self-promoting songs and videos 
featuring local gang members on Internet web sites. (National Gang 
Intelligence Center, 2009) 
Using these modern social networking methods, gangs are able to recruit, target, 
and organize illicit activities. The low cost of technology greatly reduces the threshold 
barrier for those desiring to coordinate illegal activity. As a result, with so few factors 
inhibiting a gang’s ability to access and share information, information technology 
provides its members a substantial advantage when it comes to using it to support 
criminal activity.  
To combat this threat, SPD officers need similar technological means to access 
and share information while patrolling in the car or afoot. Additionally, if SPD’s 
architecture is to provide a tactical advantage beyond that possessed by the gangs, all 
present and future technological initiatives will need to be integrated into a JBAIIC-type 
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architecture. Comparing the elements of the JBAIIC architecture to architecture used by a 
typical street gang reveals that gangs can more easily obtain an information advantage 




(a). JBAIIC Architecture for Gangs (resulting in Information 
Superiority) 
 
(b). JBAIIC Architecture 
Figure 18.   JBAIIC Architectures for Both Gangs and SPD Resulting in 
Information Superiority and Information Inferiority Respectively.  
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As a result, given the challenges facing police concerning accessing and sharing 
information, and the ease at which gangs can accomplish the same, gangs are able to 
achieve an information advantage over local law enforcement.  
 
 
Figure 19.   The Ease of Information Access Allows a Gang to Achieve 
Information Superiority Over Law Enforcement.  
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III. SPD’S ARCHITECTURE EVALUATION 
A. COMPARISONS 
Figure 20 provides a general comparison between a Seal Team EIGHT tactical 
unit and SPD patrol officers. Due to the numerous similarities in mission, tactical units 
and threat sources, the author believes that the same JBAIIC architecture model used by 
the Seals is the most appropriate model to assess SPD’s architecture. 
 
 
Figure 20.   Comparison Between Seal Team EIGHT and SPD.  
To conduct the architectural evaluation, we are guided by the model in Figure 21. 
By matching the existing capabilities of SPD with the six elements of the JBAIIC 
architecture, researchers and SPD can easily identify factors inhibiting SPD’s ability to 
fight crime. Once completed, a Technology Implementation Plan recommends courses of 




Figure 21.   Baseline JBAIIC Architecture Model 
Due to the differences between police officers and military infantry, some 
practical adjustments were made for this analysis. Specifically, the requirement for a 
JBAIIC architecture to support classified traffic is not appropriate for a police department 
that does not handle classified information on a routine basis. As a result, the JBAIIC 
architecture for SPD will need to support only secure (encrypted) and non-secure modes 
of data transport. Table 4 identifies the JBAIIC characteristics of each architectural 
element used to evaluate the fit between SPD and JBAIIC’s architecture.  
The following are the results of the architecture analysis of SPD.  
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1.  Sensors 
a. Assessment 
(1) Closed Circuit TV (CCTV). Five closed-circuit cameras 
monitor areas known for frequent crime activity. Four of the CCTVs are portable and one 
is fixed.  The portable cameras allow SPD to relocate them as needed throughout Salinas 
to monitor emerging threats. The fixed camera is mounted on top of a telephone pole in 
an area known as China Town. This camera utilizes a FireTide Wi-Fi connection and 
links directly to SPD via a dedicated T-1 line. The camera video feeds are viewable only 
at the Watch Commanders desk. 
(2) Patrolling officers/vehicles. A minimum of 11 patrol 
vehicles, with one officer per vehicle, patrol 11 of the 12 predetermined patrol areas. (See 
Appendix for patrol areas.) 
(3) Anonymous crime reporting methods. Two examples 
include: 
• Tip411: Citizens of Salinas act as the sensor by 
anonymously reporting crime by texting code 
“SPD831” to “847411.” 
• WeTip: Citizens of Salinas act as the sensor by 
anonymously reporting crime via phone (1-800-78-
CRIME).  
(4) Neighborhood Watch initiatives. Citizens of Salinas act as 
the sensor by anonymously reporting crime via methods listed above or by dialing 911.  
b. Problems 
Currently, the sensors monitoring Salinas do not provide adequate 
persistent sensing. A shrinking police force combined with limited technological sensing 
capability has significantly degraded SPD’s ability to effectively act as the primary 
sensor for the city. Specific problems include:  
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(1) Lack of persistent sensing. There is no effective persistent 
sensor network dedicated to monitoring a large area of the city other than police officers 
patrolling the streets,  
(2) CCTVs. These five cameras work, but they are not actively 
monitored. Camera video is viewable only from the Watch Commanders Desk at SPD, 
but daily responsibilities inhibit continuous/effective monitoring.  
(3) Anonymous crime reporting methods. Various methods are 
in place but currently there is no process in place to evaluate its effectiveness.  
c. Recommendation 
In the absence of a larger patrol force, SPD needs to implement an 
effective, persistent sensing capability to cover high crime areas. Due to the high levels of 
violent crime, implementing a gunshot location system (GLS) and expanding the CCTV 
coverage is strongly recommended. Additionally, streaming the CCTV video throughout 
the SPD network might create additional opportunities to ensure this data is viewed. 
However, increasing SPD’s sensing capabilities will create even more data to be 
processed and reviewed. Until more personnel can be added to the force, other internal 
process changes and/or resource decisions will have to be made in order to create 
opportunities to review this additional data. Finally, SPD should implement measures to 
assess the effectiveness of anonymous crime reporting methods. New initiatives 
impacting SPD’s sensing capabilities will be discussed in the Technology 
Implementation Plan.  
2. Blue Force Tracking (BFT) 
a. Assessment 
SPD does not employ GPS tracking of either its officers or its patrol 
vehicles and, as such, there are no means to determine the exact location of an officer on 
patrol. Currently, the only way of determining their location is from the ‘Calls for Service 
Status Board’ that is maintained by the dispatch center. Patrol officers can access this  
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information from the mobile data terminal (MDT) via the MobileCop user interface as 
shown in Figure 22. From this status board, patrol officers can determine the approximate 
location of other patrol vehicles.  
 
 
Figure 22.   The MDT’s MobileCop Status Display Identifying the Location of 
Patrolling Officers.  
b. Problems 
The inability to track an officer’s exact location is a major safety concern. 
As SPD’s workforce continues to be reduced, individual officers will have to respond 
more frequently to emergency calls for service that normally requires two or more 
officers. Depending on the level of activity, it is not uncommon for officers from one beat 
to be tasked with responding to a call for service in another beat. If an officer’s radio 
malfunctions or if the officer is wounded and unable to communicate their location to 
dispatch, there is no way of knowing the officer’s exact location.  
c. Recommendations 
For officer safety, SPD should immediately implement BFT for both 
officers and vehicles. 
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3.  Mobile Data Sharing Devices (MDSD) 
a. Assessment 
The only MDSDs implemented throughout SPD consists of the vehicle 
mounted mobile data terminals (MDT), portable magnetic voice recorders, and mobile 
and portable UHF radios. Other MDSDs in use at SPD include cell phones and iPads; 
however, neither is issued to patrol officers.  
(1) Mobile data terminals (MDT). MDTs used by SPD consist 
of Panasonic (CF series) laptops with the MobileCop message query and messaging 
system installed to connect to the dispatch center’s Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) 
system, see Figure 22. Through this interface, MDTs can access the ‘Calls for Service 
Status Board’ as previously mentioned, as well as connect to Federal and State law 
enforcement databases. MobileCop allows officers to communicate directly with other 
patrol officers via text message. However, this requires the officer’s vehicle to be stopped 
for safety reasons.  
(2) Magnetic tape recorders. These portable devices provide 
patrol officers the ability to dictate field notes while on patrol and thereby significantly 
reduce the amount of time officers have to spend behind a desk typing lengthy reports. 
Once an officer records his/her case notes, the tapes are transferred to the records staff 
who transcribes the notes into an electronic word processing format.  
(3) Portable radios. Patrol officers have access to two radios in 
the performance of their duties. One mobile radio is mounted in each vehicle and the 
other is portable handheld radio worn by the officer. These radios are not secure and 
operate in the public safety frequency spectrum. The vehicle-mounted radios are capable 
of transmitting data but only at 9600 baud.  
b. Problems 
The MDSDs used by SPD provide essential capabilities such as 
instantaneous communications and vehicle-to-vehicle text chat, but lag behind the 
capabilities of the devices utilized by gangs. For example, once an officer departs a 
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vehicle, the officer has no access to information resources except by calling the dispatch 
center or records staff at SPD over the unsecure radio network. Smart phones, netbooks, 
or PC tablet type devices with appropriate security features could greatly assist officers 
while away from their vehicles. Cell phones are not currently issued to patrol officers but, 
due to the need to make frequent phone calls, most officers carry a personal cell phone 
while on patrol. While this saves SPD the expense of paying for dozens of cell phones 
and data plans, there is a consequence to this way of doing business. For example, one 
officer who carries a personal cell phone in the patrol car, stated that when he is required 
to call someone while on patrol, he will return to the station to make the call via landline 
to avoid using his/her cell minutes for official business (Officer #4, personal 
communications, January 26, 2011). The operational impact of officers who might 
frequently return to the station to make calls is not known. For those officers who do use 
their personal cell phones, it is unclear if doing so poses a risk to SPD or county IT 
networks. Finally, the current MDSDs used by SPD do not possess any of the basic 
characteristics for a JBAIIC MDSD as listed in Table 4. 
c. Recommendations13  
(1) Distribute smart phones or other MDSDs able to access the 
internet via local cellular networks among the various patrol shifts.  
(2) Analyze vulnerabilities of using personal MDSDs. If these 
risks are acceptable, consider instituting a reimbursement plan for officers who use their 
personal MDSDs (smart cell phones, etc.) while on duty.  
(3) Analyze the operational costs associated with officers 
returning to SPD to conduct official business that could be accomplished with a MDSD.  
(4) Implement MDSDs that meet the minimum requirements 
listed in Table 4. 
                                                 
13 SPD has received funding to support the installation of both a new secure radio system and digital 
voice recorders to assist officers in dictating field notes. As of this writing, neither of these initiatives has 
been implemented department wide. These initiatives are addressed in the Technology Implementation 
Plan. 
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4.  Mobile Command Post  
a. Assessment 
In 2006, SPD integrated an International 4300 as a Mobile Command 
Vehicle (MCV) into its fleet of response vehicles (Figure 23). MCV’s robust design, 
combined with a deployable camera boom and various multi-media capabilities (TV, 
radio, DVD, etc.), originally made this vehicle a superb support facility for high-risk 
events such as hostage and barricade type situations. Currently, MCV is primarily used to 
support special events such as the annual California Rodeo, parade staging, and DUI 
processing (Officer #8, personal communications, February 23, 2011). At present, a lack 
of personnel, the absence of installed computing capabilities, and various equipment 
casualties have prevented this vehicle from being more fully utilized.  
 
 
Figure 23.   SPD International 4300, Mobile Command Vehicle (MCV). Photo 
by Detective Michael Groves, Salinas PD 
b. Problems 
In its current state, numerous equipment casualties prevent MCV from 
being used more extensively and creates a major tactical disadvantage for SPD. For 
example, the limited use of MCV reduces opportunities to provide a persistent police 
presence in high crime areas. Once properly configured, MCV could support the patrol 
force by providing a significant point of presence in areas of high crime. However, due to 
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reductions in sworn officers, this would only occur if internal business processes were 
changed to accommodate personnel working from MCV vice SPD.  
The following issues limit SPD’s ability to make a greater use of MCV:  
• Phone and data usage in MCV require a physical connection. 
There is no wireless access capability. 
• There are no built-in computing capabilities. 
• The camera system is incapable of recording video. 
• The TV does not receive TV signals, preventing access to news 
channels for SA.  
• The camera boom is not able to remain in the fully extended 
position.  
• A lack of personnel necessitates changes to internal processes to 
enable those assigned to work in MCV. 
c. Recommendation 
Repair the identified equipment casualties as soon as possible and 
incorporate MCV into daily patrol operations in high-risk areas. If SPD is unable 
implement these repairs, consider staging the MCV in high-risk areas to establish officer 
presence. Due to recent staff reductions, occupying MCV would require relocating the 
workspaces of at least two employees. At a minimum, wireless laptops could provide 
temporary computing capabilities until more permanent workstations could be purchased. 
Other possibilities include allowing interested groups such as Investigators, Violence 
Suppression Unit, Gang Task Force, Community Service Officers, or volunteers to 
incorporate MCV into daily operations.  
5. Network 
a. Assessment  
Wireless Networks. SPD is supported by two wireless networks and is 
field-testing a third. The two wireless networks in use are the land mobile radio system 
(LMRS), also known as the County RF system, and Sprint’s commercial cellular network 
that provides service to those officers authorized to carry a cell phones. Additionally, 
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SPD has begun outfitting patrol vehicles with cellular modems, which will provide 
Internet access to each patrol car through Verizon’s 3G cellular network.  
(1) County RF. Patrol vehicles and hand held radios utilize the 
County Radio Frequency (RF) network to provide communications to the dispatch center. 
This system is composed of six radio towers located throughout Monterey County and 
provides non secure 800 MHz UHF voice communications in the public safety frequency 
band. The data rate for this connection is limited to 9600 baud and connects the vehicle’s 
MDTs to the dispatch center CAD system to exchange text data. This connection allows 
patrol officers to exchange chat communications between vehicles and conduct database 
queries. The data rate provided by the LMRS though is too low to support the minimum 
bandwidth needed to transmit essential information such as mug shots that police could 
use to identify personnel while on patrol. SPD is pilot testing an initiative to provide an 
Internet capable data connection to the patrol cars via Verizon’s 3G network. As of this 
writing, no cars have completed this transition but the new wiring has been installed on 
twenty vehicles.  
(2) Commercial Cellular. SPD uses Nextel cell phones that 
connect to Sprint’s local network. Cell phones are not issued to patrol officers but are 
provided to those personnel whose job requires the use of a cell phone such as the Gang 
Task Force, Violence Suppression Unit, Investigators, Watch Commanders, and the Chief 
of Police.  
(3) Internet Access in Patrol Vehicles. This initiative and its 
impact on SPD’s capability gaps will be addressed in the Technology Implementation 
Plan.  
b. Internal Network 
SPD’s internal network is packet switched and provides a 100 Megabit 
(Mb) connection to each desktop. This network is made up of the printers, desktop 
computers, and servers that support the department’s daily activities. This network is very 
old and needs major upgrades in order to expand beyond its current capabilities. 
According to the Salinas’ IT manager, “the network is at capacity with no failover 
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capacity and cannot be expanded beyond its current 2 Gigabit trunked connection without 
major investments” (S. Golden, personal communication, 11 January 2010). Improving 
this network would require upgrading the county network as well because the county 
connection is unable to support anything beyond what SPD currently uses.  
c Problems  
(1) The lack of secure communications limits SPD’s ability to 
exercise C2 especially during real time pursuits.  
(2) The insufficient bandwidth limits a patrol officer’s ability 
to access essential information, such as mug shots, which could slow incident response.  
(3) The inability to expand SPD’s internal network 
significantly limits its ability to plan for future technologies that could aide in the fight 
against crime.  
d. Recommendations 
SPD should continue its current initiative of installing cellular modems in 
all patrol cars to provide Internet connectivity to MDTs. Additionally, SPD should meet 
with city and county IT managers to discuss the future expansion of SPD’s network.  
6. Tactical Operations Center (TOC) With Interactive—Common 
Tactical Picture (I-CTP) 
a.  Assessment 1:  Tactical Operations Center 
For SPD, the equivalent to a Tactical Operations Center (TOC) is the 911 
dispatch center, located at 1322 Natividad Road in Salinas, California (Figure 24). The 
dispatch center coordinates emergency service responses for the public-safety agencies 
throughout the county. Every year, the dispatch center receives more than 570,000 calls 
for service, and initiates emergency responses to more than 150,000 incidents (R. Perrien, 
personal communication, April 11, 2011).  
At the dispatch center, dispatchers are assigned to one of twenty-four 
workstations organized according to the different jurisdictions throughout Monterey 
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County. Information from a caller is entered into the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) 
system, which automatically forwards the request to those dispatchers specifically 
assigned to an emergency service organization such as Fire, Police, EMS (Emergency 
Medical Services), etc. In addition to these assignments, dispatchers are assigned to “call 
taking” duties as well. Call takers are the first to answer phones. If a dispatcher is 
assigned to call-taking duties and is occupied with another call at the time of a new call is 
received, the call is automatically forwarded to an available dispatcher. Should all 
dispatchers become occupied, the non-emergency calls will be placed on hold and 
emergency calls will be answered first. Watch-floor supervisors can assist as needed. At 
any given time, there are two dispatchers dedicated to supporting SPD (R. Perrien, 2011).  
Finally, neither SPD nor the dispatch center employs a full-time crime 
analyst to review incoming sensor data for the purpose of identifying trends in recent 
crime activity, or correlating historic events with current cases.  
  
 
Figure 24.   Monterey County’s Dispatch Center 
b. Assessment 2: Interactive—Common Tactical Picture 
At the dispatch center, the equivalent to an Interactive—Command 
Tactical Picture (I-CTP) is the graphical display in front of each dispatcher. When a 
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dispatcher receives a call for service, they enter the incident location into the Computer 
Aided Dispatch (CAD) system, which plots an icon on a Maverick (brand) maps 
graphical information system (GIS). Unfortunately, the icons displayed on the computer 
screen frequently do not identify the correct location as entered by dispatchers. This is 
because the Maverick maps use the centerline of the street to approximate the location of 
an address instead of a property’s parcel number. This process of converting addresses 
into coordinates on a map is known as geocoding.14 Additionally, these maps also do not 
correctly display many of Salinas’ specific characteristics such as fire hydrant locations. 
To remedy this, the dispatch center employs a private contractor part time to update the 
maps. The dispatch center does not have a ‘master’ GIS display, but each dispatcher does 
have the ability to view all activity throughout the various jurisdictions and can change 
the status of units in other jurisdictions. The GIS display, however, can only be viewed at 
the dispatch center and cannot be seen at SPD HQ or any other external agencies. The 
CAD system currently in use in the dispatch center is made by Tiburon version 7.4.1. 
This system resides on a UNIX mainframe collocated at the facility. In 2015, the current 
CAD system will reach its scheduled end of life. At that time, the dispatch center will 
need to shift to the Windows based Tiburon system, called, Command CAD, or transition 
to an entirely new CAD vendor. Finally, the current CAD system is not integrated with a 
records management system (RMS). As a result, searching historic crime events for 
actionable intelligence is a lengthy and cumbersome process. 
c. Problems  
(1) The inability to view the dispatch center’s CAD GIS 
display at SPD limits SPD’s situational awareness. 
                                                 
14 “Most geocoding in U.S. crime mapping efforts involves interpolation along a line segment stored 
in a base map. If, for example, a burglary was reported at 125 Madison Street, a geocoding program would 
determine that the dot should be placed in the middle of the left side of a line segment representing the 
addresses 101 to 149. The dot is typically offset from the street centerline at a determined distance (25 feet, 
for example). The logic of interpolation, however, does not always match reality. Not all streets are set up 
with evenly spaced land parcels of equivalent sizes and not all locales follow the same addressing logic.” 
(J. Markovic, J. Bueermann, K. Smith, 2006)  
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(2) The inaccuracy of the mapping GIS software with regard to 
plotting exact locations and correctly displaying Salinas’s specific geographical 
characteristics limits the effectiveness of both the dispatchers and SPD. 
(3) The absence of and integrated records management system 
and full time crime analyst limits situational awareness by preventing SPD from being 
able to identify emerging threats or changes in recent crime patterns15.  
d. Recommendations  
(1) Integrate CAD display into SPD network for viewing on 
supervisor workstations.  
(2) SPD needs to assess the accuracy of the Maverick maps to 
identify information specific to its needs that is inaccurate or missing. Once done, a 
prioritized list should be submitted to the county IT department so that its GIS contractor 
can make the necessary changes. 
(3) SPD should petition for a records management system to be 
included as part of the 2015 CAD replacement project. 
                                                 
15 SPD is currently in the process of screening applicants to fill a full time crime analyst position.  
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IV. RESULTS OF THE JBAIIC ARCHITECTURE EVALUATION 
SPD’s architecture is adequate for providing a public safety presence throughout 
Salinas, but it is unlikely to achieve the command and control (C2) and situational 
awareness (SA) needed to resolve its more pressing problem of gang violence. Figure 25 
shows the results of SPD’s architectural assessment. Red Xs indicate that a given 
capability does not contribute to the architectures overall ability to achieve C2 and SA 
and constitutes a capability gap. Green checks indicate that a current capability does 
contribute to the architectures overall ability to achieve C2 and SA. In short, SPD’s 
capabilities when compared to the baseline JBAIIC architecture do not provide a means 
of achieving C2 or SA. Those capabilities identified in the diagram are those that had the 
greatest impact on the assessment.  
 
 
Figure 25.   Results of SPD’s Architectural Assessment 
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Throughout the evaluation of SPD’s architecture, the two factors that contributed 
most significantly towards the number of capability gaps were:  
A. INCORRECT ARCHITECTURE  
SPD’s architecture is currently based on its need to provide a public safety 
presence to the citizens of Salinas. To combat the threat of gang violence though, SPD’s 
capabilities need to be realigned to a JBAIIC architecture that will allow SPD to achieve 
C2 and SA. Additionally, a tactical architecture such as JBAIIC will help SPD prioritize 
its resource needs so that new capabilities can be directed immediately towards existing 
gaps. In the absence of funding support to transition to a JBAIIC architecture, SPD will 
need to adopt more efficient operational procedures to create the cost savings necessary 
to afford this transition. The Technology Implementation Plan will identify potential 
courses of action, which will identify ways to implement a JBAIIC architecture in a 
resource constrained environment.  
B. INADEQUATE TECHNOLOGY 
SPD’s technology is outdated and less capable than that used by resident gangs. 
Specifically, it lacks the ability to share relevant and real-time information needed to 
coordinate actions in response to new crimes or emerging threats. As patrol officers 
continue to rely on inadequate technology, they will continue to miss opportunities to 
stop gang violence. Examples include:  
• A lack of remote access capabilities necessitates patrol officers frequent 
return to SPD effectively reducing officer presence throughout Salinas 
• Patrol officers do not have access to cell phones requiring them to either 
return to the station to place a phone call or use their personal cell phones  
• While away from their car, a patrol officer’s access to information is 
limited to the availability of the records staff or dispatchers via LMRS 
• All communications over the land mobile radio system are non-secure 
• The maps used at the dispatch center are not accurate and dispatchers do 
not have a means of accurately determining officer locations 
• The absence of a records management system integrated into CAD limits 
SPD’s ability to more efficiently identify potential crime trends 
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• Equipment casualties prevent extended use of MCV 
• Currently sensing capabilities are capable of persistently monitoring a 
small fraction of Salinas 
Table 6 identifies how SPD’s capabilities compare to the minimum capabilities of 




Architecture Characteristics of the JBAIIC Architecture Elements SPD’s Significant Results 
Sensors 
1. Sensors provide persistent monitoring of battlespace 
2. Enough sensors are deployed to cover the battlespace 
 
1. No - Unknown for anonymous crime 
tips. 
2. No - Too few sensors do not adequately 
cover crime hotspots 
Blue Force 
Tracking (BFT) 
1. Implemented with GPS 
2. Deployed on all assets and personnel 





1. Must support both classified and unclassified transfer of data16 
2. Supports ‘push, pull, & share’ of data 
3. Fully functions in bandwidth limited environment 




#1 No No Yes 
#2 No No Yes 
#3 Yes Yes No 




1. Must support both classified and unclassified transfer of data (see 
Footnote 16)  
2. Direct communications with local units and Tactical Operations 
Center 
3. Redundant Communications 
4. Must be fully operational 
1. No - No computing capabilities  
2. Yes - Direct comms w/ dispatch center  
3. Yes - Five installed radios  
4. No – Numerous equipment casualties 
Network 
1. Support classified and unclassified data types: audio, video, data. 
(see Footnote 16) 
2. Must be able to communicate with coalition partners 
1. No - Data rate insufficient for Audio and 
Video data 






1. Able to receive classified and unclassified data from sensor network  
2. Receives input from all elements of the JBAIIC architecture 
3. Displayable for local and external uses  
4. Must employ fulltime analysts who fuses sensor data into actionable 
intelligence 
 
1. Yes—See Footnote 16 
2. No—No input from CCTV video or 
crime tips reports 
3. No—Yes for local, No for external 
4. No - SPD is currently screening 
applicants for crime analyst position. 
Table 6.   Significant Results of SPDs Architectural Assessment  
                                                 
16 For the purposes of this study, the requirement of JBAIIC architecture elements to support classified and unclassified data will be deemed to be 
met by SPD capabilities able to support secure (encryption) and non-secure modes of data transport.  
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Figure 26 provides a visual depiction of the capability gaps identified from the 
analysis as well as a relative comparison of how a specific capability relates to other 
elements of the JBAIIC architecture. The three circles are used to identify characteristics 
of a specific capability that matches the minimum JBAIIC characteristics identified in 
Table 6. The breakdown is as follows:  
• Outer red circle: Identifies those capabilities that do not meet any of the 
minimum JBAIIC architecture characteristics. The section classification 
No Capability is a relative indicator of the capabilities ability to provide 
C2 and SA. 
• Inner yellow circle: Identifies those capabilities that meet at least half of 
the minimum JBAIIC architecture characteristics. The section 
classification Moderate Capability is a relative indicator of the capabilities 
ability to provide C2 and SA. 
• Center green circle: Identifies those capabilities that meet all of the 
minimum JBAIIC architecture characteristics. The section classification 
Fully Capable is a relative indicator of the capabilities ability to provide 




Figure 26.   Venn Diagram of SPD’s Architectural Capabilities Gaps 
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To assess the level of integration among the various technologies in use at SPD, 
rankings of Low, Moderate, and High were used. A ranking of Low was applied to those 
technologies and capabilities that are isolated and not configured to send or receive 
information from other devices in the architecture. A ranking of Moderate indicates that 
approximately half of the devices or capabilities are currently able to access information 
from other systems. A ranking of High was applied to those devices and technologies that 
were fully configured and capable of accessing and transporting the desired information. 




Figure 27.   Venn Diagram of SPD’s Push, Pull, and Share Capability 
Assessment  
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1.   Push Capability = Low  
a. Primary reason for this ranking: Sensor data is broadcast to 
different locations. Examples include 
• CCTV video data is only available at the Watch 
Commanders desk, which is routinely unmanned 
• Actions from patrol officers are only recorded at the 
dispatch center and on vehicle MDTs but not SPD 
headquarters 
• Anonymous crime tip data is not available at the dispatch 
center 
• CTP display data from the Tiburon GIS at the dispatch 
center is not available at SPD  
b. This gap can be reduced by:  
• Ensuring that the above sensor data is available at both the 
dispatch center and SPD headquarters.  
 
2. Pull Capability = Moderate  
a. Primary reason for this ranking: Patrol officers have access to 
essential law enforcement database.  
b. This gap can be further reduced by:  
• Obtaining Internet access for each vehicle allowing patrol 
officers to access SPD’s local databases (e.g., mug shots 
and fingerprints) 
• Configuring SPD’s local databases for remote access from 
MDSDs  
 
3. Share Capability = Low 
a. Patrol Officers have no way of disseminating data except through 
unsecure voice (LMRS), personal cell phones (also unsecure), and text formatted 
messages on the MDTs (secure).  
b. This gap can be further reduced by:  
• implementing a means for secure voice communications  
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• issuing secure MDSDs such as smart phones, iPads, or 
tablet type devices to all Patrol Officers 
 
To combat this threat, SPD will need technology and an architecture allowing 
them to access and share information in the same ways that are available to gangs while 
patrolling in the car or afoot. Additionally, if SPD desires its architecture to provide a 
tactical advantage beyond that possessed by the gangs, they will need to implement a 
JBAIIC-like architecture that incorporates all aspects of its present and near future 
capabilities. Figure 28, shows the recommended JBAIIC architecture for SPD.  
 
 
Figure 28.   Recommended JBAIIC Architecture for SPD 
 69
C. SPD 2015: TECHNOLOGY IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
Based on both the capability gaps identified from the architecture assessment and 
the significant resource constraints at SPD, a Technology Implementation Plan (TIP) has 
been created to help SPD transition from its current state to a future state that implements 
a JBAIIC architecture. This future state is called “SPD 2015” and is represented by the 
model in Figure 28. This plan starts with a summary of the completed architecture 
evaluation identifying the significant problems and recommendations as well as the 
implications of these measures (Tables 7–10). Next, the TIP provides a brief introduction 
of four technological initiatives occurring at SPD and shows how each impacts SPD’s 
capability gaps. Finally, the TIP concludes with three recommended courses of action for 
SPD that will put it on the path towards achieving the desired goal of SPD 2015. These 
courses of action are: #1 Create a Vision to Guide SPD’s Technology Initiatives, #2 
Implement Business Process Reengineering, and #3 Complete Risk Assessments Prior to 
Implementing New Technology. 
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D. SUMMARY OF ARCHITECTURAL EVALUATION 
 
Capability Problems Recommendations Implications 
Sensors 
1. Sensing capabilities do not 
provide adequate coverage 
throughout Salinas.  
2. Closed Circuit TV (CCTV) video 
is not actively monitored. 
3. There are no measures in place to 
evaluate the effectiveness of 
anonymous crime reporting. 
1. Implement persistent sensing methods 
such as a Gunshot Locations System 
or increased # of CCTVs. (Problem 
#1) 
2. Stream CCTV video to SPD’s private 
network via multicasting. (Problem 
#2) 
3. Institute measures to validate 
effectiveness of anonymous tips. 
(Problem #3) 
• Problems #1, #2 & #3: Increased 
sensing capabilities such as CCTVs will 
create more data that needs to be 
reviewed. Changes to SPD’s internal 
organizational responsibilities and 
processes will be needed to support 
improvements to SPD’s sensing 
capabilities (Gunshot Locations 
Systems, CCTV, and anonymous tips).  
Blue Force 
Tracking (BFT) 
1. No BFT capability exists at SPD.  
2. Emergency response to injured 
(unable to communicate) officers 
could be delayed for officers 
away from their patrol car.  
1. Implement BFT throughout SPD on 
patrol cars and patrol officers via: 
a. GPS transmitter on the patrol car 
or other GPS source (Problem 
#1), and 
b. Cellular phone tracking 
(Problems # 1, 2,) until Unity 
Radios are installed (and have 
GPS tracking capability) as part 
of the NGEN project (see section 
IV.E.3.a.).  
• Problems #1 & #2: Implementing BFT 
at SPD could initially create perceptions 
of excessive monitoring that might 
overshadow the need for officer safety.  
 















1. Current capabilities lag behind 
those of gang members who have 
access to internet accessible 
smart phones.  
2. MDSDs are not issued to patrol 
officers.  
3. The risks associated with using 
personal MDSDs (smart phones, 
etc.) to conduct official business 
are unknown.  
4. The operational cost of not of 
issuing MDSD to patrol officers 
is unknown. 
5. MDSDs used by SPD do not 
possess the characteristics listed 
in Table 4. 
1. Distribute internet accessible cellular 
MDSDs to either all patrol officers or 
to be shared among the various patrol 
shifts. (Problems #1 & 2) 
2. Analyze vulnerabilities of using 
personal MDSDs. If these risks are 
acceptable provide MDSDs to patrol 
officers per recommendation #1 
above. (Problem #3) 
3. Analyze the operational costs 
associated with officers returning to 
SPD to conduct official business that 
could be accomplished with a 
MDSD. (Problem #4) 
4. Implement only those MDSDs that 
meet the minimum characteristics in 
Table 4. (Problem #5) 
• Problem #1 & #2: MDSDs issued to all 
patrol officers could be cost prohibitive 
and sharing MDSDs among shifts will 
provide significant savings but will 
require a device manager to track 
devices return, maintenance etc. If this 
is still cost prohibitive, changes in 
internal business processes could 
provide the cost savings necessary to 
support this initiative. 
• Problem #3: Use of personal MDSDs 
could impact chain of custody if official 
records, logs or video are saved on 
them. MDSDs used by SPD must 
comply with the Monterey County 
Device Security Standards Plan. 
• Problem #4: Instituting a reimbursement 
plan for officers who use their personal 
MDSDs (smart cell phones, etc.) while 
on duty could have a positive impact on 
SPD resource utilization.  
•  Problem #5: Implementing devices that 
meet all of these requirements will be 
expensive and will most likely require 
some tradeoffs between cost and 
operational need.  
 







Capability Problems Recommendations Implications 
Mobile Command 
Post (MCP) 
1. Numerous equipment casualties 
prevent more frequent use of the 
MCV creating a significant 
tactical disadvantage for SPD.  
2. The limited use of the MCV 
reduces opportunities to provide 
a persistent police presence in 
high crime areas.  
 
1. Correct all discrepancies and 
incorporate MCV into daily patrol 
operations in high-risk areas. 
(Problem #1) 
2. If implementing into daily patrol 
operations is not possible, consider 
assigning MCV to other internal 
divisions that could more frequently 
use this asset. (Problem #2) 
• Problems #1 & #2: Implementing MCV 
into daily patrol strategies at a minimum 
would require changing internal 
business processes such as altering 
patrol shift routines or relocating 




Network 1. The lack of secure 
communications limits SPD’s 
ability to exercise C2. 
2. Insufficient bandwidth limits 
patrol officer effectiveness. 
3. The inability to expand SPD’s 
internal network significantly 
limits its ability to plan for 
future technologies that could 
aide in the fight against crime.  
1. Implement a secure means of 
communicating. Note: The NGEN 
Radio System will provide secure 
communications. (Problem #1) 
2. Expedite installation of cellular 
modems to all patrol cars for Internet 
access. (Problem # 2) 
3. Meet with city and county IT officials 
to discuss expansion of SPD’s 
network. (Problem #3) 
• Problem #1: Secure communications 
will create new ways of coordinating 
strategic operations.  
• Problem #2: Increasing the access to 
information in the patrol car could 
reduce sensing capabilities because 
officers will be able to get more 
administrative work done from the 
patrol car.  
• Problem #3: Increasing SPD’s network 
capacity will reduce the likelihood of 
catastrophic loss of essential data in the 
event the network is damaged.  
 













with Interactive - 
Common Tactical 
Picture (I-CTP) 
1. The inability to view the 
dispatch center’s CAD GIS 
display at SPD limits situational 
awareness.  
2. Inaccurate GIS maps limit 
effectiveness of dispatchers and 
SPD. 
3. The dispatch center’s CAD does 
not have an integrated records 
management system (RMS). 
4. Neither the dispatch center nor 
SPD have a full time crime 
analyst. 
 
1. Integrate the CAD display into SPD’s 
network for viewing on supervisor 
workstations. (Problem #1) 
2. Provide county IT division a 
prioritized list of GIS mapping 
corrections. (Problem #2) 
3. Petition for a records management 
system (RMS) to be included as part 
of the 2015 CAD replacement project 
and hire full time crime analyst. 
(Problems #3 & 4) 
 
• Problem #1: Having access to the 
dispatch centers CAD display would 
improve a patrol officer’s ability to 
recognize new crime hotspots. 
• Problem #2: Accurate maps will 
improve incident response.  
• Problem #3 & #4: A crime analyst 
supported by an integrated RMS, could 
more easily identify crime trends, 
activity hotspots and emerging threats 
throughout the city. SPD is currently in 
the process of screening applicants for a 
full time crime analyst.  
 





E.  CURRENT TECHNOLOGY INITIATIVES 
1.  Technology Initiative #1: Transitioning from Magnetic Tape 
Recorders to Digital Recorders Via the iPod Touch 
 
Figure 29.   Screen Capture of Pocket Dictate Digital Voice Recording 
Application Using the iPod Touch v.4 (From NCH, 2011) 
a. General Information 
SPD has received a grant to replace its aging magnetic tape recorders with 
digital recorders. Currently, patrol officers dictate case notes into a magnetic recorder 
while on patrol and upon returning to the station, hand the tape(s) over to the records staff 
where they are transcribed into case logs. The iPod Touch v.4 has been chosen as the 
replacement for the tape recorders. To provide voice-recording capabilities, SPD will use 
the PocketDictate application, version 5.19, by NCH Software. The iPod Touch is a 
portable media player and personal digital assistant that uses Wi-Fi to connect to the 
Internet. These devices will provide patrol officers the ability to email saved recordings 




Wi-Fi network. There are thousands of applications, or “apps,” currently available for the 
iPod Touch.  As a result, this device could be used in numerous additional ways beyond 
that of a voice recorder.   
b. Specific Details 
Table 11 identifies additional details concerning this initiative. 
 
JBAIIC Architecture Category Mobile Data Sharing Device (MDSD) 
Problems Addressed (As taken 
from the MDSD section of the 
Summary of Architectural 
Evaluation Table 8). 
• The use of iPod Touch’s fully resolves problem 
#2 and satisfies recommendation #1. 
 
• The use of iPod Touchs partially resolves problem 
#1. The need to have access to a Wi-Fi hotspot 
prevents resolution of this problem.  
 
Capabilities Gained 
• Mobile Internet Access (at Wi-Fi hotspots)  
• Full push, pull, and share of data between patrol 
officers (Video Conferencing (among similar 
devices), email, etc.) when connected via Wi-Fi. 
The device functions in a bandwidth limited 
environment and can be ruggedized with 
accessories.  
Limitations Patrol officers will need to locate available Wi-Fi hotspots to transmit data to SPD or other officers.  
Planned Start Date May 2011 
Planned Completion Date None Specified 
Table 11.   Specific Details of the iPod Touch 
c. Comments  
(1) The use of the iPod Touch represents a significant technological 
enhancement to SPD’s MDSD capabilities. While these devices offer tremendous 
potential for SPD, its advanced capabilities and portability require special considerations 
regarding both device management and potential introduction of vulnerabilities into 
SPD’s network. For example, these devices can access the internet through publicly 
available Wi-Fi hotspots and, therefore, will operate outside of the protective boundary of 
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the city and county’s secure IT network. This means that SPD will have to assume the 
additional responsibility of ensuring that appropriate security safeguards, such as data 
encryption, are properly implemented. Until the risks associated with its use are fully 
assessed by SPD, it could be a source of disruption to SPD’s operations.  
(2) These devices only transmit data via Wi-Fi. As a result, officers 
using them will need to frequent the numerous Wi-Fi hotspots throughout Salinas. These 
hotspots are open to the public as well as those at local business and could be used after 
obtaining the network password (with permission of the operator). Consideration will 
need to be given as to whether this poses a threat to patrol officers who might frequently 
return to the same location throughout a shift to transmit data files.  
d. Recommendations  
(1) The use of iPods as a replacement for magnetic tape recorders is an 
excellent idea but one that should not be rushed. SPD should not implement the use of 
iPods until COAs #1 (Vision), #2 (Business Process Reengineering), and #3 (Conduct 
Risk Assessments) have been completed. Completing these courses of action will ensure 
this technology is properly implemented so as to make best use of its multipurpose 
architecture.  
(2) Do not use publicly available Wi-Fi hotspots to transmit voice 
recordings unless appropriate security (encryption) measures are in place. Until such 
time, have officers upload data when returning to SPD as part of their normal patrol 
duties.  
(3) As more uses for this device are discovered, conduct risk 
assessments for each intended use.  
e. Impact on Capability Gap  
Once internal risk assessments are completed (see Course of Action #3), 
the iPod Touch could significantly reduce the capability gap in the Mobile Data Sharing 
Device category of the JBAIIC architecture. This device is capable of meeting all 
elements of the characteristics specified in Table 4. Figure 30 shows the impact the iPod 
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Touch could have on the MDSD capability gap. If properly implemented this device 
could provide enhanced operational capabilities to SPD.  
 
 
Figure 30.   Use of an iPod and Its Impact on SPD’s MDSD Capability Gap  
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2.  Technology Initiative #2: Providing Internet Access to Patrol Cars 
Via Verizon’s Commercial Cellular Network  
a.  General Information 
SPD is currently in the process of configuring all patrol vehicles with 
wireless Internet access as a result of receiving a grant from the Edward Byrne Memorial 
Justice Assistance program. This project will transition the data connection from the 
current analog land mobile radio system to a digital cellular connection that utilizes 
Verizon’s local cellular network. When completed, this project will provide significantly 
increased bandwidth to the mobile data terminals (MDTs) located in each patrol car. 
Currently several vehicles are testing this technology and wiring has been installed on 20 
vehicles. This will be a private network that is not accessible to the general public.  
b. Specific Details 




Network & Mobile Data Sharing Device 
Problems Addressed (As taken 
from the Network and MDSD 
section of the Summary of 
Architectural Evaluation 
Tables 8 and 9). 
The transition to cellular network will resolve 
problem #1 in the Network Category and #4 in 
the MDSD category.  
 
Capabilities Gained • Internet Access 
• Increased Bandwidth 
Planned Start Date In Progress 
Planned Completion Date Summer 2012 
Table 12.   Specific Details of the Implementation of Cellular Modems 
c. Comments 
(1) The most significant capability of this new configuration will be 
the ability of patrol officers to connect to the SPD local network while on patrol. Patrol 
officers will be able to access local databases, personal work files, and all applications 
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available to officers at SPD. Connecting to SPD’s network will require using Citrix 
Remote Access software, which is installed and maintained by the city of Salinas 
Information Technology Department (ITD). 
(2) The MDTs that have are participating in the testing phase have 
been configured in such a way that prevents them from simultaneously connecting to the 
Internet and the various law enforcement databases accessed through the country 
network. This prohibition is per policy of the Department of Justice to prevent viruses 
and other malware located on the Internet from infecting the servers that support the 
various law enforcement databases. This policy is enforced by the county ITD and 
requires configuring the Radio Internet Protocol (IP) Server to lock down the IP stack 
preventing dual use or split tunneling of the MDT’s IP address (J. Crane, personal 
communication 26 January 2011). Tests of this configuration revealed very slow 
connections while utilizing the Citrix connection. As a result, the County ITD is 
requesting permission from the DOJ to allow split tunneling. If this is authorized, the 
County ITD will implement appropriate security protocols to ensure no vulnerabilities 
from the Internet are introduced into the network.  
d. Recommendations 
SPD will need to educate the patrol force regarding possible ways Internet 
access could introduce viruses or other malicious software into both the city and county 
networks. 
e. Impact on Capability Gap 
The transition to a commercial cellular network provides a significant 
increase in both information access and information sharing capabilities to the patrol 
officer (Figure 31). Due to the significant increase in bandwidth provided by the cellular 
network, officers will be able to incorporate new functionality to their field operations. 
Examples include:  
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(1) Direct access to the local mug shot database will provide a more 
expeditious means of having victims positively identify their assailant. Also, mug shots 
can be instantly shared among patrol officers participating in the search for a wanted 
person resulting in increased situational awareness (SA).  
(2) The use of wireless access will provide the Chief of Police the 
means to implement Blue Force Tracking (BFT) like capabilities. While not as accurate 
as GPS, position tracking via cellular technology will allow the SPD to experiment with 
the tactical and SA capabilities that BFT could provide while increasing officer safety at 
the same time.  
(3) Patrol officers would be able to monitor the video feeds from 
SPD’s CCTV network and immediately respond to suspicious activity.17  
(4) Internet access in patrol vehicles will enable the use of video 
conferencing technology. With this technology, patrol officers can virtually attend 
operations meetings or communicate with other patrol vehicles via video chat.  
 
                                                 
17 Viewing CCTV video from the SPD’s wireless cameras would require enabling the multicasting 
functionality on the cameras, routers, and server.  
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Figure 31.   Impact of Internet Access on SPD’s Capability Gaps 
 82
3.  Technology Initiative #3: Monterey County Next Generation Public 
Safety Communications System  
a. General Information 
The County of Monterey awarded a $15 million dollar contract to the 
Harris Corporation to upgrade its legacy land mobile radio system (LMRS). The project, 
called NGEN, for Next Generation Radio, will add improved interoperability, enhanced 
coverage, and new functionality to the communications capabilities of the public safety 
organizations throughout Monterey County (Dillon, 2011). This project will introduce the 
XG-100 Unity portable and mobile radios; full-spectrum multiband radios that provide 
first responders with secure communications and Bluetooth capability. In addition, these 
radios meet the FCC Narrowband18 requirements and comply with phase one and two of 
the P2519 industry standard. Table 13 identifies additional details concerning this 
initiative. 
b. Specific Details 
Table 13.   Specific Details of the NGEN Implementation Project 
                                                 
18 FCC has made narrowbanding a requirement to “promote more efficient use of the VHF and UHF 
land mobile bands” (Bercovici, 2006). 
19 Project 25 (P25) is a collection of “standards that allow radios and other components to interoperate 
regardless of manufacturer—enabling emergency responders to exchange critical communications” ("P25 
Compliance", 2006). 
20 GPS position data is displayed on a small screen on the XG-100 P and M models. Currently these 
radios are not capable of sending GPS data to a external source such as a Tactical Operations Center but 
Harris is currently in the planning process to provide this functionality in the future (B. Wood, personal 
communication, March 14, 2011).  
JBAIIC Architecture Category Mobile Data Sharing Device & Network & BFT 
Problems Addressed  
(As taken from the MDSD and 
Network section of the Summary of 
Architectural Evaluation Table 7). 
y Network (Problem #2)—NGEN provides secure 
communications  
y BFT (Problems #1 and #2)—Officers will be able to 
locate other officers  
Capabilities Gained y Secure Communications  
y BFT via GPS20, and Bluetooth for hands free use 
y Regional interoperability due to P25 compliance  
Planned Start Date June 2011 
Planned Completion Date Dec 2011 
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c. Comments 
The NGEN project will provide substantial improvements over the 
existing LMRS. Of the many improvements, SPD will now be able to communicate 
securely without the fear that their communications are being monitored. This new 
capability will provide a strategic advantage for SPD’s patrol officers responding to gang 
violence.  
d. Recommendations: None 
e. Impact on Capability Gap 
Once installed, and when combined with the benefits of Internet access, 
NGEN will completely reduce the capability gaps in the Network category (Figure 32). 
Additionally, the BFT gap will also be eliminated once enhanced GPS functionality is 





Figure 32.   Impact of Unity Radios on SPD’s Capability Gaps 
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4. Technology Initiative #4: ShotSpotter’s Gunshot Location System  
a. General Information 
In partnership with the Naval Postgraduate School, the Salinas Police 
Department is in the process of implementing ShotSpotter’s gunshot location system 
(GLS) into its arsenal of crime fighting capabilities. This system uses acoustic sensors to 
detect and locate gunshot and explosive events in real time (ShotSpotter, 2011). 
Approximately 50 sensors will be installed in a three square mile in East Salinas, an area 
known for high crime (Figure 33). Upon detecting an event, sensors will transmit the data 
to ShotSpotter’s Mountain View, CA headquarters, where trained staff will analyze the 
events acoustic characteristics. Those events classified as potential gunfire or explosions 
will be forwarded to the dispatch center for action. The system is anticipated to be 
operational in summer 2011 and will provide SPD the following actionable data:  
• Nearest street address 
• Time of event 
• Incident type (Gunfire, explosion, firework, or non-threatening sound) 
• Audio clip 
• Path of travel, in the case of mobile shooter(s) (ShotSpotter, 2011) 
Table 14 identifies additional details concerning this initiative. 
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Figure 33.   Anticipated Coverage Area of ShotSpotter’s Gunshot Location 
System (From Google Maps, 2011) 
b. Specific Details 
 
JBAIIC Architecture Category Sensor 
Problems Addressed 1. Lack of persistent sensing (problem # 1) 
2. Anonymous crime reporting effectiveness 
(problem #3) 
Capabilities Gained 1. Persistent sensing in an area known for violent 
crime 
2. Verification of the effectiveness of SPD’s 
anonymous crime methods. 
Planned Start Date Summer 2011 
Planned Completion Date July 10, 2011 
Table 14.   Specific Details about ShotSpotter’s Gunshot Location System 
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c. Comments 
A gunshot location system brings many opportunities to SPD and is an 
exceptional and much needed sensing resource. With this system, SPD will be able to 
accurately determine the boundaries of high-risk areas as well as provide a much reduced 
response time to both reported and unreported gunshot events. Additional issues specific 
to the implementation of GLS technology include:  
• The accuracy of the system will enable SPD to experiment with 
various methods of targeted enforcement. 
• Certain annual events such as the Fourth of July and New Year’s 
Eve will provide SPD opportunities to demonstrate and educate the 
general public as to the capabilities of GLS technology.  
• The location of events detected outside of the boundaries of a 
coverage area decreases the further away the event is from the 
coverage area. These events might require a different response 
strategy.  
• The location of events might necessitate changes to beat 
boundaries or minimum officer response requirements.  
The most significant challenge SPD will have with the ShotSpotter GLS is 
paying for the annual 120K (estimated) subscription fee. The Naval Postgraduate School 
received a grant from the Department of Homeland Security to pay for the installation 
and a one-year service plan as part of a research effort. At the end of one year, if SPD 
desires to continue using the system funding will need to be provided or the GLS services 
will be terminated.  
d. Recommendations 
Due to the limited one-year service agreement, SPD should assign a 
Project Manager capable of enforcing installation preparations as well as monitoring 
system performance throughout the first year.  
e. Impact on Gap  
A gunshot location system will significantly reduce SPD’s sensor 
capability gap (Figure 34). By having numerous sensors distributed throughout high 
crime areas, SPD will be able to continuously monitor and respond to events. With this 
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system, SPD will no longer be reliant on the citizens in the gang-controlled areas of East 
Salinas to report shootings. As a result, despite recent staff reductions, SPD’s quick 




Figure 34.   The Impact of ShotSpotter’s GLS on SPD’s Capability Gaps 
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F. COURSES OF ACTION 
To assist SPD in transitioning from its present architecture to that of a JBAIIC-
like architecture called SPD 2015, three courses of action are suggested:  
• #1 Create a Vision to Guide SPD’s Technology Initiatives 
• #2 Implement Business Process Reengineering  
• #3 Complete Risk Assessments Prior to Implementing New Technology 
 
 
Figure 35.   Visual Rendering of the Courses of Action As They Relate to the 
Technology Implementation Plan.  
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS  
A. COURSE OF ACTION #1—CREATE A VISION TO GUIDE SPD’S 
TECHNOLOGY INITIATIVES 
The first recommended course of action for SPD is to create a vision statement. 
Based on SPD resource constraints, the continued threats posed by gangs, and the 
planned implementation of several technological capabilities, a vision is needed to guide 
SPD from its present capabilities to a future improved state. A vision statement depicting 
the ideal end state will require the participation of all members of SPD so they can better 
visualize those actions that will be most supportive of SPD during this process of major 
technological change. A vision statement will ensure SPD makes best use of all available 
resources, unifies employee efforts to a common cause, and provides a common goal that 
all members can help achieve. Collectively this will maximize SPD’s crime fighting 
potential during a time of significant change.  
This vision statement can be incorporated into the SPD Chief of Police’s Vision 
or become an entirely separate vision, such as a Capabilities Transformation Vision or an 
Information Technology Vision. In addition, this vision would provide SPD a chance to 
demonstrate those standards published in its value statement on the SPD website (Salinas 
Police Department, 2011). Figure 36 shows how the values of SPD can provide the 
central link between a current SPD vision and SPD 2015, the desired future information 
and communications architecture.  
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Figure 36.   Use of a Vision Statement to Achieve SPD 2015. 
In parallel to the SPD IT improvement effort, the State of California is undergoing 
a multi-year effort to improve its own IT infrastructure. This initiative started with a 
vision of implementing a world class IT program (California, 2011). To accomplish this, 
the Chief Information Officer (CIO) of California created an IT Strategic Plan that details 
the necessary changes needed to improve the State’s uses of IT. While SPD and the State 
of California are very different organizations, the three goals listed in the state’s Strategic 
Plan relate directly to many of the IT needs of SPD. The goals of the Strategic Plan are 
listed in the left column of the table below opposite SPD’s IT needs.  
 
California Information Technology 
Strategic Plan Goals  
SPD’s IT Needs 
• Make Government Transparent, 
Accessible, and Secure 
• Drive Innovation and Collaboration  
• Make Information Technology Reliable 
and Sustainable Through Consolidated 
Platforms and Shared Services.  
• Implement Secure Communications 
(NGEN) and Mobile Data Sharing Devices 
(iPod Touch) to combat Gang violence 
• Support Joint Operational Capabilities and 
Information Sharing (NGEN) 
• Connect Isolated Systems (Mug shot and 
Fingerprint Databases), Internet access to 
vehicles, and 2015 CAD replacement 
Table 15.   Comparison of California’s Strategic Goals and IT Needs of SPD. 
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SPD can use the California Strategic Plan as a template to ensure its vision is in 
alignment with the current efforts of the State of California.  
Finally, regardless of vision type, the ability of SPD to successfully implement its 
plan will be significantly influenced by both IT capabilities and current business 
processes. For example, if a specific vision is not supported by an appropriate IT systems 
or business processes, changes will need to be made in one or both areas. Depending on 
the amount of change needed this could impact SPD’s ability to achieve its vision in the 
short term. Table 16 identifies how vision focus areas are impacted by both IT systems 
and business processes.  
 
Vision Focus Areas IT System needed to Support Vision




Fully integrated systems with 
push, pull, & share capability. 




Databases are accessible to a 
wide community of users. XML 
based technologies, P. 25 
compliant radios, etc. 




100% communications coverage 
in all patrol areas. 
Patrol strategy devised 
around times of highest 
activity. Resource staging 




Mobile platforms support patrol 
officers while away from 
vehicles to allow increased 
interaction with the public. 
Multiple patrol officers 
patrolling the same beat to 
allow for increased direct 
interaction with the public. 
Metrics 
Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) 
w/ integrated records 
management system (RMS) and 
Full Time Analyst to synthesize 
sensor data into actionable 
intelligence.  
Data driven policing 
strategies, Heat Maps, 
frequent changes to ops in 
response to new trends. 
 





Course of Action #1: Create a Vision to Guide SPD’s 
Technology Initiatives 
Create a vision to guide SPD’s capabilities transformation 




B. COURSE OF ACTION #2—IMPLEMENT BUSINESS PROCESS 
REENGINEERING 
The capability gaps identified in the architectural assessment combined with 
SPD’s reduction in resources have greatly reduced any slack in the operational and 
responsive posture of SPD. In such an environment, Business Process Reengineering 
(BPR) can create resource opportunities but, to do so, requires evaluating all current 
business practices. Upon completing Course of Action #1, SPD should implement BPR 
as a way to extend the effectiveness of its current capabilities.  
BPR is defined as the “radical redesign of age-old process[es] in the quest for 
significant improvement in performance” (Teng, J. Grover, V. and Fiedler, K., 1994). 
The purpose of BPR is not optimization such as happens when existing processes are left 
intact but computers are used to speed them up (Hammer, 1990). According to Hammer, 
BPR cannot be meticulously planned or accomplished in small groups taking cautionary 
steps. Rather, it is “an all or nothing proposition” where old assumptions are challenged 
and all processes are modified in favor of new ways of doing business (Hammer, 1990). 
For SPD, the upcoming implementation of new technologies offers an excellent time to 
evaluate existing processes to determine where improvements can be made.  
SPD relies on many processes in the performance of its daily responsibilities; 
several of the processes frequently used by patrol officers are identified in Table 17.  
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Table 17.   Frequently Used Internal and External Operational Processes. 
In many instances, a process will require other processes to be initiated in order to 
be completed. For example, arresting a person (EP # 3) involves EP #4, #5, and #7 (table 
14) at a minimum, in addition to potentially using all of the Internal Processes listed 
above. Recognizing how these processes interact with each other can lead to dramatic 
improvements. Finding a more efficient way to complete one process could provide 
significant time or cost savings to all interconnecting processes. For example, after an 
individual is arrested (EP #3), patrol officers may have to manually reenter basic case 
information (Name, Date, etc.) on as many as five different forms (IP #2) (Officer #1, 
personal communications, May 16, 2011). Reengineering the existing process with 
technology that automatically enters this information on all required forms would not 
only improve EP #3, but also IP #3, #4, and #5, and possibly others. The time saved by 
patrol officers would create more time to patrol or work on higher priority tasks.  
External Process #5, Identifying People, is another area where BPR could provide 
substantial savings. Due to the limitations of the Land Mobile Radio System, the patrol 
officers are not able to access their local mug shot database while on patrol. After a crime 
is committed, the only way to obtain a positive identification from a victim/witness is to 
either bring the victim to the station to review mug shots or have the officer return to the 
station, obtain mug shots, return to the site, and present them to the victim/witness. 
Internal Processes (IP) 
 
1) Creating various reports 
2) Filling out forms 
3) Processing Field Interview (FI) cards 
4) Processing evidence 
5) Accessing information:  
a. while in the patrol car 
b. while at the office  
c. from Internal Databases: (fingerprint, 
mug shot, etc.) 
6) Sharing information internally 
7) Planning operations 
External Processes (EP) 
 
1) Traffic enforcement 
2) Incident response 
3) Arresting people 
4) Filling out FI Cards 
5) Identifying people:  
a. Suspicious persons brought in  
b. Charged suspects 
6) Moving people: 
a. Victims who can identify perpetrators from 
mug shots  
b. Persons of interest, criminals, etc. 
7) Sharing information externally 
 96
Accessing this database from the patrol car would eliminate the need for patrol officers to 
return to the station providing significant savings in fuel while better utilizing available 
man hours.  
 
Course of Action #2: Implement Business Process Reengineering
 Evaluate internal and external processes to uncover potential 
resource savings.  
 
C. COURSE OF ACTION #3—COMPLETE RISK ASSESSMENTS PRIOR 
TO IMPLEMENTING NEW TECHNOLOGY 
Today’s law enforcement agencies have more technology choices available to 
them than ever before and many of these technologies can provide significant capability 
improvements. Technologies such as a gunshot location system (GLS), and closed circuit 
TV (CCTV) cameras allow a small number of officers to provide a virtual police 
presence throughout a city. Figure 37 demonstrates how technology is utilized by a 
typical police department. Figure 37(a) shows how technology enhances the capabilities 
of patrol officers to effectively manage a larger body of work. Figure 37(b) shows the 






Figure 37.   How Technology Is Used in a Typical Police Department. 
Prior to implementing new technologies, SPD must assess the impact the 
technology will have on both existing business processes and its information and 
communications architecture. This evaluation is called a risk assessment. According to 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology, “risk” is defined as “the likelihood of 
a given threat-source exercising a particular potential vulnerability, and the resulting 
impact of that adverse event on the organization” (Stoneburner, Goguen, & Feringa, 
2002). Currently SPD is planning to implement four unique technologies that have the 
potential to significantly reduce crime in Salinas. Each of these initiatives involves some 
measure of risk that upon implementation, could introduce vulnerabilities capable of 
adversely affecting the entire architecture. These risks and vulnerabilities must be 
understood. An April 27, 2011 announcement stated Apple’s iPhone and iPad save the 
devices location is an example of how a technological capability could introduce 
vulnerabilities for law enforcement (Lowensohn, 2011). For example, these position files 
could reveal operational tactics such as patrol strategies that could be learned by others if 
an officer’s device gets lost or stolen. While each of the initiatives SPD is implementing 
is state of the art, SPD’s ability to accurately identify significant risks and vulnerabilities 
will ultimately determine whether these technologies enhance or reduce SPD’s crime 
fighting capabilities. Additionally, the introduction of new technology might require 
either minor or major changes to business procedures within the agency in order take full 
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advantage of the technology (Maness, et al., 2001). By conducting risk assessments, 
managers at SPD will be able to view each technological initiative as it relates to the 
entire SPD organization and determine if appropriate safe guards are in place prior to 
implementing a new technology.   
Finally, to ensure success with any integration effort, it is essential that all 
initiatives have both the commitment of senior management and cooperation of the 
members of the user community (Stoneburner et al., 2002).  
 
Course of Action #3: Complete Risk Assessment Prior to 
Implementing New Technology 
Implement technology risk assessments to limit 
organizational exposure to unknown threats and vulnerabilities.  
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VI. FUTURE RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS 
This research revealed numerous opportunities for future research.  Based on the 
results of the Architectural evaluation and the recommendations listed in the Technology 
Implementation Plan, the following researcher options provide the best opportunity to 
benefit SPD as well as other public safety organizations in Monterey County.  
A.  RECOMMENDED RESEARCH  
• Monitor the implementation of ShotSpotter’s Gunshot Location System 
and assess its effectiveness on reducing crime rates in East Salinas.   
• Evaluate current business practices at SPD and determine which ones 
could best be reengineered with a technological solution.  
B.  ADDITIONAL RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES  
Due to the numerous technological initiatives currently underway at SPD, there 
exists ample opportunities to investigate how information technologies can enhance 
police officer effectiveness.  Some research options include: 
1.  Technology 
• The set up and technical configuration of a Tactical Operations 
Center at SPD. 
• Configuring multicasting on the the existing CCTVs for viewing 
on patrol vehicles’ Mobile Data Terminals.  
• Analysis into which Computer Aided Dispatch system the dispatch 
center should implement in 2015.  
• Analysis into how an integrated Records Management System 
could improve policing strategies at SPD. 
2.  Business Process Reengineering  
• Determine more practical and secure uses for the iPod beyond that 
of a digital voice recorder 
• Upon the completion of repairs to the Mobile Command Vehicle 
an assessment of the ways to improve its utilization.   
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• Evaluate the effectiveness of SPD’s anonymous crime reporting 
methods and recommend methods to improve this sensing 
capability.   
3.  Research External to SPD 
• Compare the estimated contractor costs to correct the digital maps 
used by the dispatch center with other mapping solutions to 
determine which could provide the accuracy needed to support the 
public safety organizations of the Monterey County at a reduced 
cost.   
Various public safety organizations in the Monterey County are using different 
technologies for the same purpose.  For example, the Pebble Beach Fire Department uses 
GST Mapper, by GeoSpatial Technologies, Inc., to maintain situational awareness with 
regard to the location of its fire engines.  The Salinas Fire Department, on the other hand, 
uses a mobile version of Tiburon’s Computer Aided Dispatch system.  Research to 
identify other similar uses of technologies among the various public safety agencies in 
Monterey County could provide improved situational awareness for agency officials at 
significant cost savings.   
C. CONCLUSION 
This thesis introduced the JBAIIC architectural model as a way to improve the 
Salinas Police Department’s ability to achieve command and control (C2) and situational 
awareness (SA) while combating violent crime. This architecture has been successfully 
implemented by Seal TEAM Eight to support counter insurgency operations in the 
Middle East. Similarities between insurgents and domestic gangs made the JBAIIC 
architecture an appropriate tool to use by domestic law enforcement agencies. Using the 
JBAIIC model, researchers identified the information and communications capabilities of 
a typical gang and showed that when a gang can access and share information more 
efficiently than law enforcement agencies, it creates significant opportunities to 
coordinate and execute illicit criminal activities. After completing a field demonstration, 
researchers analyzed SPD’s information and communications architecture. This analysis 
identified significant capability gaps and showed SPD’s current architecture is not 
capable of achieving the C2 and SA needed to effectively combat gang violence. 
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Recommendations were made to assist SPD in closing each identified gap. Finally, due to 
the significant resource constraints facing SPD and the planned implementation of 
several technological initiatives, a Technology Implementation Plan (TIP) was included 
as part of this thesis. The TIP identified how each of SPD’s technological initiatives 
would impact its JBAIIC architecture and then concluded with three courses of action for 
SPD. Following these courses of action will allow SPD to more effectively use existing 
capabilities while ensuring future technologies are implemented in such a way to ensure 
long term benefit to SPD and Salinas.  
This thesis explored the following questions, and provides in summary, the 
following findings answered the flowing questions:  
• How can elements from the JBAIIC test bed knowledge base be adapted to 
the existing information architecture used by SPD to enhance its crime 
fighting strategies? Demonstration #1 showed how implementing a 
Common Tactical Picture that utilizes Blue Force Tracking can 
significantly improve SPD’s ability to achieve C2 and SA. 
• How will members of SPD successfully implement the JBAIIC 
architecture? SPD 2015, the recommended future architecture for SPD in 
conjunction with the three courses of action, will allow SPD to implement 
a JBAIIC architecture.  
• How could other municipal governments facing similar issues with high 
crime and constrained resources apply the architecture created for Salinas 
to extend the effectiveness of its police force? Figure 1 and Table 4 
identify the JBAIIC architectural model and the essential characteristics 
of each architectural element respectively.  Any agency facing similar 
resource constraints and high crime could use these tools to assess its own 
architecture to identify potential capability gaps. 
The Salinas Police Department will continue to face many challenges as it adjusts 
to recent reductions in sworn officers, fiscal constraints, and a deeply entrenched gang 
population. In an effort to remain effective as a law enforcement agency SPD must 
embrace a new way of how its technological capabilities are used in the fight against 
crime. By implementing a JBAIIC architecture SPD can most effectively combat Salinas’ 
longstanding problems of crime while efficiently integrating new technological 
capabilities.  
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APPENDIX. SPD PATROL BEATS  
 
Figure 38.   SPD Police Beats 
 
Figure 39.   Salinas, California Aerial View (From Google, 2011) 
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